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The Central Foreign Exchange Triangle, 1932—1934
Theaction of the United States in leaving the gold standard
closed the first phase of the breakup of the nucleus. In Chap
ters 31 and 32 attention is concentrated on the division of
the world's currency system into two great areas, gold and
sterling, and direct emphasis is not placed on the position
of the central foreign exchange triangle. This major thread
in our analysis will now be taken up again and the rest
our discussion of Disintegration will be largely in terms of
the behavior of the triangle as such.
The Triangle in 1932,Unbalancedbut Provided with a
Point of Reference for Future Stabilization
During the greater part of the year and a half after Great
Britain abandoned the gold standard sterling depreciation
in terms of the principal gold currencies was aboutper cent.
(Chart 69) .Atthis level British exporters enjoyed a competi.
tive advantage over exporters in the gold standard countries
though they were at a disadvantage in competition with the
exporters of certain countries in the sterling area itself.1 The
exchange position therefore had the effect of concentrating
upon the gold standard countries a disproportionate share of
the world's burdens in finding a new economic equilibrium.
As long as the depreciation of sterling was a common deprecia.
tion in terms of the exchanges of the other center countries,
and the dollar-franc rate did not seriously overvalue either
currency in terms of the other, a point of reference for a Lu
ture stabilization existed that would eliminate this particular
1 Cf.Ch.CultivatingEngland's Garden.
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source of international strain. As long as the gold standard
arrangements in the United States and France made these
two countries active buyers and sellers of gold in the London
bullion market this point of reference was simply expressed
by the London price of gold (cf. Ch. 30). By the simple act
of fixing the price at which gold would be bought and sold
freely by Great Britain at an appropriate level, sterling could
be stabilized at a rate that would distribute more justly the
unavoidable economic burdens of the three countries and of
the currency groups they represented, and place the center
countries on an equality in their dealings with the periphery
countries as far as exchange rates were concerned. Time, how-
ever, was of the essence. The world of gold was a patchwork
quilt, and prolonged sterling undervaluation, since it was
bound to influence the different portions of that quilt in
different ways and in unequal degree, was bound, sooner or
later, to rob the dollar-franc rate and consequently the Lon-
don price of gold of its serviceableness as a point of reference
for future stabilization. In this respect the central foreign
exchange triangle was seriously unbalanced. It was unbal-
anced also in a more profound sense. The fundamental lack
of equilibrium in the world economy, which had destroyed
the international gold standard as a device for facilitating
the exchange of goods and services among nations and the
creation and repayment of international debt, still continued.
As long as fundamental economic adjustments were not made,
any new system of exchange rates, even one that involved no
serious overvaluation of the exchange of any one of the cen-
ter countries, ran the risk of being overthrown by sudden
movements of capital, or undermined by the efforts of in-
dividual countries to escape from intolerable economic strain
by exporting their economic difficulties.
A Question of Precedence
Our account of the World of Sterling and the World of Gold
has indicated that radical measures were being taken to meetWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1261
the underlying problems, but that permanent solutions were
still to be worked out. International trade was becoming ever
more deeply enmeshed in the trammels of the new protection.
In the third quarter of 1932, as compared with the monthly
average of 1929, three-fourths of the former amount of goods
were being exchanged at one-half the former prices, so that
in value international trade was little over one-third of what
it had been before the depression. There was no real reversal
in the general downward trend of prices, the course of which
from September 1931 to March 1933 is described by the
World Economic Survey, 1932/3 (p.40):
"There were few [countries] on or off the gold standard, where
the index-number for March 1933 did not stand at the lowest
level yet recorded in the depression. In the United Kingdom the
recovery after June—July 1932, though subsequently diminished
by a falling tendency from October onwards, had not been wholly
lost by March. In Chile and Japan prices rose substantially be-
cause of currency inflation. There was, in March, a slight upward
movement in several countries coincident with the security specu-
lation and exchange disturbances which were caused by the de-
preciation of the United States dollar.
Apart from the unsettlement in March 1933,..., therehad
been only one period in the last four years during which the
downward trend of prices had definitely been arrested. That pe-
riod was for three or four months before and after the Lausanne
Conference in July 1932. The average level of wholesale prices
rose between June and October by a little over 2 per cent in the
United States of America, and by almost 9 per cent in the United
Kingdom, but, in many countries, the decline continued steadily,
and in none, except where there was definite inflation, was the
improvement anything but hesitating and temporary."
The fundamental price deadlock between agricultural and
industrial prices continued and was even intensified. Idle
capital continued to seek short term employment in central
money markets and to flow from countries where interest
rates were high to countries where interest rates were low
or falling. Budgetary deficits multiplied. The burdens upon1262 DISINTEGRATION
debtors became intolerable and led to defaults and the re-
pudiation of domestic and international debt. Reparation had
to be abolished and the payment of war debts suspended.
World markets, in both commodities and internationally
traded in securities were broken up.2
These conditions were clearly extremely unfavorable to
permanent currency stabilization. Yet it was equally clear
that they were in large measure the result of the currency
instability represented by the depreciation of the periphery
countries with reference to the center, and the breakup of
the central nucleus. There could be no permanent exchange
stability without a solution of the underlying economic prob-
lems. There could be no solution of these economic problems
without exchange stabilization. Statesmen were divided on a
great question of precedence in their endeavor to escape from
this difficulty; namely, whether stabilization of the exchanges
should precede or follow economic readjustment. But they
did not always divide in the same way. The position taken
by the major powers on this issue was colored throughout by
the actual state of the exchanges. During 1932 the low rate
of sterling in terms of gold currencies lay in the background
of all practical discussions of international remedial meas-
ures. No account of the events of 1933 and 1934 can be com-
plete or accurate without a proper appreciation of this fact.
The representatives of the powers assembled in Lausanne
in the summer of 1932 to write the last chapter on German
reparation were aware that the settlement of this problem
was not in itself a sufficient remedy for the situation confront-
ing them. They resolved therefore to request the League of
Nations to convoke a World Monetary and Economic Con-
ference to work out international solutions of the general fi-
nancial and economic problem. The League of Nations ap-
pointed a Preparatory Commission of Experts to draw up an
agenda. In their discussion in Geneva from October 31 to
November 9, 1932, and from January g to 19, 1933, the divi-
2 World Economic Survey, 1932/3,pp. table, p. 157, and p. i88.WHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1263
sion of the powers on the question of precedence was revealed.
Leo Pasvolsky has summed up the position of the British
Experts on the Preparatory Commission:
"There were three fundamental conditions pre-requisite to a re-
turn to gold laid down by Great Britain and the other non-gold
countries. They were as follows:
i. The gap between the level of costs of production and that of
commodity prices, produced by the recent drastic fall in prices,
must be closed by a rise in the latter.
2. An international economic balance must be reestablished
through a satisfactory settlement of the war-debt controversy, a
removal of foreign exchange controls, and a substantial modifica-
tion of economic policies to be achieved by an abandonment of
extraordinary trade restrictions and a progressive lowering, as
well as eventual relative stabilization, of customs tariffs.
3. Agreement must be reached on a number of technical reforms
of the gold standard system, such as a reduction in the percentage
of reserves, the abolition of gold coins, and the establishment of
a system of central banking collaboration."
The British took this attitude for several reasons. In the first
place the injury done to London as an international financial
center by the shock of Great Britain's leaving the gold stand-
ard was not as great as might have been expected. Confidence
in sterling had been effectually restored by the late spring of
1932. There was every prospect that a large volume of foreign
exchange business temporarily diverted to Paris would soon
return to London. Latin American countries had recently
been converting their dollar deposits into sterling. No perma-
nent injury to the sterling acceptance business was to be
expected, for the attempt to build up an acceptance market
in Paris had failed and there was a strong feeling on the con-
tinent that the American discount market did not possess
8 Current Monetary Issues (Brookings Institution, pp. 23—4. In this
section and in the succeeding account of the Conference this source is heavily
drawn upon. Mr. Pasvolsky quotes many of the official documents relevant to
the Conference, and for convenience, references are to his citations rather
than to official sources.1264 DISINTEGRATION
and was not likely to achieve the stability required of an
international financial center. The attitude of the British
negotiators of the German standstill agreements had been
more constructive and accommodating and less legalistic than
that of the American negotiators and had created an atmos-
phere of confidence and trust in the steady continuance of
German business relations with Great Britain in the future.
As confidence in sterling increased, confidence in the dollar
and in American financial institutions declined. On May 6
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle estimated that for-
eign deposits and holdings of sterling bills in London were
about £300 million, an increase over September 1931.Im-
mediate stabilization did not seem to the British an urgent
necessity for the reestablishment of the international prestige
of the City. On this score they could afford to wait and to lay
down conditions.
In the second place, the British were in a position to see
with peculiar clarity the vital importance of a reversal of the
downward trend of prices, especially prices in the gold stand-
ard countries. The necessity for raising prices had been the
burden of the Macmillan Report which had reached the fol-
lowing famous conclusion (sec. 267/8, pp. 114—15):
"Weare emphatically of the opinion that, even if a further fall
of wholesale prices be avoided, their stabilization at approxi-
mately the present level would be a serious disaster for all coun-
tries of the world alike; and that the avoidance of such an event
should be a prime object of international statesmanship.
The losses which are now being incurred by nearly all cate-
gories of producers of average efficiency in nearly all countries of
the world are an overwhelming proof that the fall of commodity
prices has gone far beyond the substantial reduction which
might be justified in the case of many important commodities by
the increases in productive efficiency which have been achieved in
recent years. Consequently, even the continuance of the present
price level—quite apart from a further fall-—must prolong busi-
ness losses and the unemployment which the attempt to avoid
these losses necessarily brings with it, until a substantial down-WHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1265
ward readjustment of money-costs has been somehow brought
about. This would mean a reduction of money-incomes except to
the extent that efficiency can be increased yet further. But it is
obvious that the reduction of money-incomes must encounter
sistance. Each individual, whatever may be the ultimate effects
upon his standard of life, resents the lowering of his salary or his
wages by economic pressure, and cannot readily believe that this
can be necessary at a time when the technique of production is
making revolutionary strides forward. Governments and
Banks will, justly or unjustly, be blamed for the misfortune.
Social unrest will tend to make moderate and rational remedies
more difficult the longer they are delayed."
This conclusion, in its general aspect, had been doubly and
triply reinforced by the effects of the further drastic fall in
prices following publication of the Report, and was widely
accepted. But in 1932 a general increase in prices initiated
outside Great Britain, in particular in the gold standard coun-
tries, was in peculiar harmony with British interests. The
downward trend in British prices had been checked by the
depreciation of sterling, and the restoration of confidence,
and by the easy money policy which these two developments
had made possible. Further drastic declines in prices in the
other gold standard countries, whether brought about by gov-
ernment pressure, as in Germany, or by the general forces off
deflation, were a threat to the continued enjoyment of the
advantages gained by leaving the gold standard and at the
same time clinging to orthodox financial practice. On the
other hand, a general rise in prices in the world of gold would
have meant that the British easy money policy upon which
the cultivation of the home market largely depended, could
be safely continued, that the debt-paying and buying capacity
of British customers would be improved, and that the ad-
vantages of a sober fiscal policy and of a low rate of exchange
could both be retained. Therefore the British experts urged a
world-wide cheap money policy in order to raise prices, and
asserted categorically that they could consider no definite rate
for stabilizing sterling. Such a rate, they pointed out, could1266 DISINTEGRATION
not be determined upon until it was seen whether prices in
gold standard countries were going to rise or fall.
In the third place, the new protection was peculiarly ham-
pering to British trade, at variance with all British tradition,
and a severe impediment to the successful functioning of the
great British commodity markets and of the international
financial machinery of the City.
Finally, Great Britain was provided with an alternative to
world-wide stabilization of currencies, that of cultivating her
own garden.
The experts of the gold standard countries advanced the
general argument that there could be no restoration of a
genuine economic balance, removal of exchange and trade
restrictions, and no proper adjustment of prices to costs un-
less there was, concurrently, exchange stabilization. "They
pointed out," Mr. Pasvolsky writes (op. cit., p. 25)
"that fluctuating foreign exchanges represent an immense poten-
tial risk of sudden alterations in the terms of trade among coun-
tries, and that unless this risk were removed no country could
consent to forego the use of trade restrictions which provide a
weapon for combating these changes. The fulfillment of the con-
ditions laid down would have for its principal objective the cessa-
tion of economic warfare and the promotion of an economic
equilibrium, whereas in the absence of stable foreign
such warfare would be merely intensified and the already existing
disequilibrium rendered more widespread and profound."
On the specific question of the necessity of raising prices
Mr. Pasvolsky further describes their attitude (p. 29)
"Economic recovery, they argued, means fundamentally an in-
crease in demand for goods and services, national and interna-
tional, and a consequent expansion of production and trade. A
proper functioning of a credit organization, again nationally and
internationally, is a vital factor in this process. And whatever
might be accomplished within a given country, internationally
there can be no hope of a resumption of credit relations until an
international standard of value exists once more. Without such aWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1267
standard, independent movements of national price levels under
the impetus of uncoordinated domestic price-raising measures
would merely serve to increase the already existing maladjust-
ments in the world price structure and thus retard rather than
promote general economic recovery through a curtailment of in-
ternational trade.
Moreover, they maintained that efforts on the part of impor-
tant commercial nations to seek foreign trade advantage through
currency depreciation inevitably lead to a fall in gold prices.
They pointed to the experience of the countries which were still
on the gold standard and which found themselves compelled to
meet the competition of the non-gold countries by reducing the
prices of their exports."
When the Preparatory Commission held its first meeting
in October the deadlock seemed complete, but at the second
meeting it was broken sufficiently to allow the preparation
of a Draft Annotated Agenda for the forthcoming World
Economic Conference. The principle adopted was that the
problems of exchange stabilization and economic reconstruc-
tion should be attacked simultaneously. A return to an in-
ternational gold standard system operating in an international
world economy was recommended as the objective; mean-
while, lines of policy were laid down for countries on the gold
standard, countries off the gold standard, and countries pegged
to gold. These policies were:
"a) Countries with a free gold standard and with abundant mone-
tary reserves:
i) To pursue a liberal credit policy, characterised by low money
rates in the short-term market and a reduction of long-term
money rates by conversions and other operations as far as feasible;
ii) As far as market conditions and central bank statutes permit,
to maintain an open market policy designed to provide a plenti-
ful supply of credit;
iii) To allow gold to flow Out freely;
iv) To permit the greatest freedom possible to outward capital
movements in order to facilitate sound foreign investments.1268 DISINTEGRATION
b) Countries which have left the gold standard:
i)Efforts should be made to avoid a competition between states
to acquire a temporary advantage in international trade by de-
preciating the external value of their currency below such a point
as is required to re-establish internal equilibrium;
ii)Under present conditions, exchange rates are liable to be
constantly disturbed by speculative movements to the disadvan-
tage of international trade. In a period prior to the adoption of
a new parity, it is advisable for the authorities regulating the
currencies concerned to smooth Out, so far as their resources per-
mit, day-to-day fluctuations in the exchanges due to speculative
influences by buying and selling foreign currencies. The success
of such measures would be enhanced by the co-operation of other
markets.
c)Countries which have introduced exchange restrictions,
whether they have abandoned the gold standard or not:
i) It is desirable that these restrictions should be totally abolished
as early as possible. It is realised, however, that this ultimate aim
cannot in all cases be immediately attained. In such circum-
stances, the restrictions applied to foreign trade should be relaxed
or abolished in the first instance, even though it may be necessary
to maintain them for a time with regard to capital movements.
ii) Such relaxation may, in certain cases where the external value
of the currency has depreciated, necessitate the abandonment of
existing parities. In a number of countries, exchange restrictions
would seem to defeat their own end; for, whenever the official
rate of exchange is maintained at a higher level than the eco-
nomic rate, a form of import premium is given to all importers
and a form of export duty imposed on all exporters. Experience
seems to have proved that, when a careful policy of gradually re-
laxing restrictions is pursued, internal confidence in the currency
can be maintained, although, of course, in such circumstances, the
necessity of effecting budgetary equilibrium and of resisting in-
flationary tendencies will prove to be of paramount importance.
In such cases, it would seem particularly valuable to maintain a
close relationship between these countries, the Financial Organ-
ization of the League and the Bank for International Settlements,
in order to devise and apply the appropriate policy in each case.
In the case of certain countries which are heavily indebtedWHO IS SOVEREIGN?
abroad,more especially on short-term, a solution of the debt
problem is necessary before their governments will be in a
tion to modify existing monetary policy."
The first of these suggestions was clearly directed primarily
to the United States, and the second to Great Britain, for
discussing stabilization the experts said: "in practice, certain
countries are in a key position in that the reestablishment
a free gold standard by them would influence action in a
number of other countries."
Meanwhile, the characteristics of the central foreign
change triangle continued unchanged. Persistent sterling un-
dervaluation kept prices in the gold standard countries under
pressure. This was a hard and uncompromising obstacle to
price raising schemes by monetary means. But as long as a
gold standard system existed with reference to which sterling
fluctuated, this particular obstacle could have been overcome
by a simple appreciation of sterling had the actual as well as
the intended effects of the operations of the Exchange Equa'-
ization Account been confined to smoothing out day to day
fluctuations in the exchanges. In the first quarter of 1933they
were not so confined, and contrary to the policy proclaimed
when the Account was first established, the Account did
interfere with the general level of sterling. By so doing it
greatly increased the strains within the central triangle.
The Triangle, 1933—I 934—graphically presented
During the single year 1933 and the first months of
thecentral foreign exchange triangle passed through a series
of extraordinary changes. A period of active support of the
dollar by the British Exchange Equalization Account was
followed in quick succession by a rapid depreciation of the
dollar when the United States left the gold standard, a
determined effort by the Account to peg the sterling-franc
rate, a period of free three-cornered adjustment between the
dollar, the franc, and the pound, the inauguration of a golld
Ibid., pp. p.34.1270 DISINTEGRATION
buying policy by the United States designed to depreciate the
dollar in both pounds and francs, and finally by the new ex-
change relationships resulting from the devaluation of the
dollar.
The behavior of the triangle during this remarkable period
is graphically presented in Chart So, in which the following
four series have been plotted from January 1933 to March
1934:
i)the sterling-franc exchange3)the sterling-dollar exchange
rate rate
2)thedollar-francexchange4)the London price of gold
rate
The movement of these series is shown in relation to the
position prevailing on April 1, 1933, and the base line is
drawn at the following values: 87 francs per pound for the
sterling-franc exchange rate; 3.93 cents per franc for the
dollar-franc exchange rate; 3.42 dollars per pound for the
sterling-dollar exchange rate; 120 shillings per ounce for the
price of gold in London. These values are obtained as fol-
lows: the sterling-dollar rate and the sterling-franc rate are
the actual rates prevailing on April 1, 1933. The dollar-franc
rate is the calculated cross rate between New York and Paris
derived from these two rates. It happens to be also the actual
rate for francs in New York on that day. The price of gold in
London—120 shillings per ounce—is the calculated franc
T/T parity rate; that is, it is the price that represents the bid
of the Bank of France in the London market at its established
buying price for gold less cost of shipment when the sterling-
franc rate was 87 francs per pound.
The arrangement of the scales for each of the three ex-
change rates is such that an equal distance on the chart
represents an equal percentage deviation from the old
parities prevailing before September i 931.
The chart is drawn from the viewpoint of London. A
decline in the value of the pound in terms of the other two
currencies is shown, therefore, by a falling line, and an in-WHO IS SOVEREIGN?
crease in the value of the pound in terms of the other two
currencies is shown by a rising line. A depreciation of the
dollarin terms of the pound being thus shown by a rising
CHART 8o
The Central Foreign Exchange Triangle and the London Price of Gold,
January I,1933—March31,1934, daily
line, a depreciation of the dollar in terms of the franc is also
shown by a rising line.
This method of presentation carries no implications of
any sort concerning the relative importance of any rate in the
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lion of the chart, we examined the behavior of the dollar-
franc rate to see whether it displayed any characteristics of a
cross rate.6 We compared the calculated cross rate between
Paris and New York, derived from the sterling-franc and the
sterling-dollar rates, with the actual rate for every day during
1933. The days on which it was cheaper to remit to Paris
NUMBER OF DAYS DURING MONTH WHEN
THE CROSS RATE, NEW YORK-PARIS, WAS
Lower than theHigher than the













from New York by way of London than by purchasing francs
directly were two to three times more numerous when the
franc was strong in terms of both the dollar and the pound,.
as it was during most of the period from May to mid-October,
than the days on which direct remittance was cheaper. The
forces responsible for this phenomenon were the same in
character as the movements between the continent and New
York which passed through the London market during i gig—
25 and continually complicated the process by which Eng-
land returned to the gold standard in 1925. The evidence
that strength in francs and indirect remittance through Lon-
don go together supports two generalizations:(i)that a
strong movement of funds between two centers whose direct
exchange market is relatively narrow tends to move the rate
between them soasto encourage remittance indirectly
through the financial center with the broadest market;(2)
that in the central foreign exchange triangle the franc-dollar
rate was the weakest link. In October and November when
0 Cf. Ch. 29, Possible Modes of Behavior of any Foreign Exchange Triangle.WHO IS SOVEREIGN?
the franc was weak in both dollars and pounds there was no
tendency for indirect remittance to be the cheaper
but in December, when the franc ceased to depreciate
sterling, the cross rate was lower than the actual rate
thirds of the time.
Two precautions must be taken against possible
pretation of Chart 8o.the first place itis completely
neutral on the question of the rising pound vs. the falling
dollar or franc. During a large portion of the period covered
alterations in the relations between the pound, the
and the franc were undoubtedly due to events taking place in
the United States. It might, therefore, be contended that
proper recognition of this fact would require a rise in the
sterling-dollar rate to be represented by a downward line,
stead of an upward one as is done in the chart, on the ground
that the dollar was falling rather than the pound rising. The
chart, however, has nothing to do with the underlying causes
of the changes it discloses. It merely describes the relations
between the rates. In the second place, the choice of the
system of rates as it existed on April 1, 1933 as a basing point
does not imply a belief that this system of rates was in any
sense 'normal,' or that there was or should be any tendency
to return to it. The market adjustment of the three rates
one another was, of course, as complete on any other day dur-
ing the year as it was on April i. That date is chosen as a base
solely to bring out the relations of the three rates at various
times compared with the relations actually existing just
fore America left the gold standard. It is a purely arbitrary
choice made for descriptive purposes.
The fluctuations of the three rates illustrate the genera]I
modes of behavior to which any triangular system of rates fs
subject as described in Chapter 29. Whenever durfng 1933
the dollar fell faster in Paris than in London, the pound
declined in Paris. This is particularly clear in August, Sep-
tember, and October. Whenever the sterling-franc rate was
stable, as during June and July, the pound and the franc1274 DISINTEGRATION
moved together in terms of the dollar. Whenever the dollar
fell faster in London than in Paris, as in the latter part of
April, the pound rose in Paris. When, as in January and
February, the dollar-franc rate fluctuations were held within
gold points, the same principles applied, though the relation-
ships are not clear in the chart because of the smallness of
the scale.
The Triangle in 1 Bound and Free
Pegging the Sterling-Dollar Rate
In January and February 1933 and during the American
'interregnum' of late March and early April the Exchange
Equalization Account held the sterling-dollar rate within the
range of 3.39 to 3.46, and for the greater part of this time the
limits were even narrower, from 3.41 to 3.44. This interven-
tion came at a critical moment in the relations of the center
countries, and though based on financial, as distinct from
economic or political grounds,7 had major economic and
political repercussions. Continued undervaluation of ster-
ling, even if only a byproduct of 'day to day smoothing' of the
exchanges was to the advantage of British exporters and did
not relieve the gold standard countries of deflationary pres-
sure. It also greatly increased the strains within the central
foreign exchange triangle.
During January and the first ten days of February the
pound was strong in both New York and Paris. This strength
was accentuated by growing fears of inflation in the United
Ch. TheCritical Decisions of January In TheEconomist,Ex-
change Account Supplement, May 5, 1934, N. F. Hall describes the Account's
operations during the first months of 1933: "the movement of balances into
London [which was] due partly to increasing apprehension about the general
situation in the United States enabled the British authorities not only to sup.
port the dollar, and, in so doing, to reduce the movement of gold out of the
United States, but also to take the opportunity of acquiring the quick assets
that were necessary before any permanent stabilization of the pound could be
carried out. Indeed, in view of the increasing instability of the United States,
it was becoming more and more important that London should maintain and
improve its international liquidity."WHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1275
States and by a political crisis in France on February 9, which
resulted in a strong movement of funds from Paris to Lon••
don. The British control supported the franc by purchases of
foreign exchange and of gold.8 The franc-dollar rate was
steadyand the pound fluctuated in almost identical degree
in terms of both currencies. During the week of February i 6,
however, the relations of the three currencies changed. The
French situation improved with the formation of the Daladier
government, while that in America was greatly weakened by
the banking crisis in Michigan. The franc was strong in both
London and New York. The fall of the dollar in terms of the
franc was limited by the gold points, but there was no such
limitation in the case of the sterling-franc rate. Francs tended
to rise more rapidly in London than dollars fell in Paris.
Under such circumstances arbitrage opportunities would
have been opened tending to check the rise of the franc in
London, or pull the dollar up with it. The strength of the
franc was not in itself sufficient to carry the dollar upward
against its underlying weakness in sterling, but the dollar did
rise because it was being supported by the British control.
The general strength of sterling soon spread to all markets,
and but for the intervention of the Account, the triangle
would have been adjusted by a common decline of francs and
dollars in London.9 From September 1931 to December 1932
the triangle, though unbalanced, had been free to adjust itself
in this way, but now official intervention made this impos-
sible. The pressures dammed up in one place found an outlet
in another, however, and in so doing restored freedom of
movement to the triangle. On April 20 the United States left
the gold standard.
America leaves the Gold Standard
During the interregnum from March 4 to April 20 when the
gold standard in the United States was partly suspended, the
8RotterdamscheBankvereeniging, Monthly Review) March, 1934.
Cf. p. 1056 where this situation is abstractly stated in the third of the three
generalizations there1276 DISINTEGRATION
monetary and financial policy of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion took definite form.
The government was determined to raise prices. To ac-
complish this end it proposed to use the following means:
i) To impose upon the Federal Reserve system a program of
purchases of government securities up tobillion.These pur-
chases were to be made either from the public or the Treasury,
and if they resulted in a deficit in the required reserves of the
Federal Reserve banks, no penalty tax was to be imposed. This
marked the end, for the time being, of the Federal Reserve banks
as an independent force in the determination of credit policy.
2)If the Federal Reserve banks would not agree with the Treas-
ury to carry out such a policy, or if such a policy did not raise
prices, then the government would purchase maturing govern-
ment bonds by Treasury notes up tobillion.This was a return
to the greenbacks of the Civil War.
3)If this second expedient also proved ineffective in raising
prices, then the government would reduce the gold content of the
dollar.
4) To supplement the three major inflationary devices, some
place would be found for silver in the banking reserves of the
country.
5) These monetary measures would be supplemented by a large
public works program.
This program was directed primarily toward bringing
about a change in the relations between debtors and creditors
in the United States by forcing a general increase in Ameri-
can prices. It marked a definite break with the policy of the
other gold standard countries which opposed an inflationary
rise in prices as the major solution of their economic prob-
lems. It marked an enthusiastic acceptance of that part of the
recommendation of the Preparatory Commission chiefly ad-
dressed to the United States, but at the same time it paved the
way for a rejection of the Commission's general thesis that the
solutions of the world's economic problems should be inter-
national.
Membership in the gold standard system was, under theWHO IS SOVEREIGN?
conditionsdiscussed above, an obstacle in the path of the
new Administration in carrying out its economic program.
On April 20 a bill was introduced into Congress with the
proval of the President giving him the powers required to
carry Out the inflationary policy outlined above, but not
making their use mandatory. This bill became, when passed
on May 12, Title III of the Farm Relief Act, and was gen-
erally known as the Thomas Amendment or the Inflation
Bill. On the day it was introduced the American gold export
embargo was made absolute. America definitely left the goki
standard and the depreciation of the dollar began.
The dollar depreciated rapidly in both sterling and francs
immediately after April 19,butduring the latter part of the
month it depreciated more rapidly in sterling than in francs.
This meant of course that the pound was strong in Paris,
and the sterling-franc rate reached 90 on April 27. This
three-cornered adjustment is shown on Chart 8o by the move-
ment of the sterling-dollar line above the dollar-franc rate
line, and a simultaneous rise in the sterling-franc line. Since,
with the abandonment of the gold standard by the United
States, the London price of gold was now based upon the
Paris T/T parity price, the decline of the franc in London
was reflected in a fall in the London price of gold. For the
same reason, the British Exchange Equalization Account
ceased to base its operations upon the dollar, and based them
upon the franc.
The weakness of the franc immediately following the first
depreciation of the dollar reflected the uncertainty in the
marketsas to the future of the remaining gold standard cur-
rencies, and on April 27 the French government felt com-
pelled to issue a statement to the effect that France had no
intention of following the United States off gold. At the
same time the British Exchange Equalization Account pur-
chased francs in order to minimize the rise of the pound in
Paris and to provide itself with a portfolio of francs for future
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conclusion of a £30 million credit which was announced on
April 28, the day following M. Bonnet's announcement that
France would remain on the gold standard. This credit was
for 6 months at 21,4 per cent and was granted to the French
Treasury by a group of British banks. It was in the form of
treasury bills which were to be sold against francs by the
French Treasury in cooperation with the Bank of England,
thus putting the French Treasury in funds pending the collec-
tion of taxes and also providing means for strengthening the
French exchange. Repayment was provided for by an agree-
ment under which the Bank of France would cede to the
Treasury the remainder of its sterling balances acquired be-
fore the abandonment of the gold standard by England in
exchange for francs without prejudice to the arrangements
for apportioning the Bank of France losses on these balances
already described.10 In consequence, the franc improved
strongly in London, the rate reaching 84 francs to the pound
on May i. The price of gold rose correspondingly to 123 s.
d. The dollar, however, continued to depreciate under the
impact of a capital flight and speculative sales, and now fell
more rapidly in Paris than in London. This is shown on the
chart by the movement of the dollar-franc line above the
sterling-dollar line.
Pegging the Sterling-Franc Rate
These April adjustments were followed by a period of rela-
tive stabilization of the sterling-franc rate which lasted
through May, June, July, and the first part of August. The
franc settled down at about 84 francs per pound with a
corresponding London gold price of about i 22 shillings. As
one of the most remarkable characteristics of man is his
capacity for getting used to things, only a relatively short
period of narrow fluctuations about this rate was sufficient to
give it a sort of sanction that no one reading the British
i0SamuelMontagu & Co., Weekly Review, May 4, '933; cf. Ch.32,The Treat-
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financialpress at that time could fail to note. It became a sort:
of symbol of the conservative aspect of British financia.
policy.
By contributing to a stabl.e exchange relationship between
the pound and the franc the British Exchange Equalization
Account helped to bind together the exchanges of the sterling
countries and those of the gold countries. A wide area of ex-
change stability was thus brought into being. Just as the
dollar-franc rate had, after September 1931,provideda point
of reference for a future stabilization of sterling, so the ster-
ling-franc rate now provided a point of reference for a future
dollar stabilization. The relatively stable price of gold in
London of about 122 s. was a symbol of this wide area
stable exchanges. The common movement of the dollar in
terms of francs and pounds, clearly shown in Chart 8o, was a
measure of dollar appreciation or depreciation in terms of a
standard of genuine significance. But just as the appropriate-
ness of the dollar-franc rate as a point of reference for a future
sterling stabilization before April 1933 had been undermined
by the unequal impact of sterling undervaluation upon the
dollar and the franc, so the appropriateness of the sterling-
franc rate as a point of reference for future dollar stabiliza-
tion was undermined by the unequal impact of ever increasing
dollar depreciation upon the pound and the franc.
The World Economic Conference
In conformity with the recommendations of the Preparatory
Commission of Experts preliminary negotiations among the
Powers were undertaken in the spring of 1933 to lay the basis
for the projected World Monetary and Economic Confer-
ence. Plans for a series of conferences between President
Roosevelt and foreign statesmen were made before the
United States decided to abandon the gold standard, and Mr.
MacDonald and M. Herriot were actually on the high seas en
route to Washington when this action was taken. Com-
muniques were issued after the conversations stressing, with1280 DISINTEGRATION
varying emphasis, the desirability of raising prices and sta-
bilizing the exchanges. They revealed that the United States,
which had so long urged Great Britain to stabilize sterling,
had not completely disassociated herself from a program of
exchange stabilization, but also that exchange stabilization
had been replaced as a major objective by price raising in
the American program and that price raising had become
more and more closely associated with large scale public
works expenditures. Though the original emphasis of the
Preparatory Commission was thus radically changed, it was
decided during the Washington discussions to convene the
World Conference on June 12.
On May i2the Inflation Bill became law. During its pas-
sage through Congress fears of inflation in America on a large
scale had made the markets nervous. The dollar continued to
depreciate in sterling until it reached 4.06 on May 6. It im-
proved during the next two weeks, as shown in the chart, but
forward dollars continued at a substantial discount. On
May 20 sterling touched 3.87, but from then until the opening
of the World Conference the dollar depreciated uninter-
ruptedly in both London and Paris. On June 12 the sterling-
dollar rate was 4.14andthe dollar-franc rate 4.84 cents.
During this decline of the dollar the position of the Powers
on the 'question of precedence' changed remarkably. The
British now perceived clearly the advantages of at least an
immediate de facto stabilization and the dangers of an in-
flationary policy. The issues that had divided the experts at
Geneva still divided the nations, but into different camps.
This was made apparent in the informal negotiations in
progress when the Conference opened and in the initial
Declaration of Policy by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at
the outset of the Conference itself.
This Declaration stated explicitly the British conviction
that prices should be raised in order to bring about a proper
adjustment of prices to costs, that exchange restrictions and
trade barriers should be removed, and that internationalWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 12811
lendingshould be resumed. It urged a world-wide policy
cheap credit backed by open market operations by central
banks as the main instrument for raising prices, but damned
with faint praise the American program of large government
expenditures for public works. Great Britain was not willing,
for the sake of rising prices, to abandon orthodox fiscal
policies.
On the question of stabilization the Chancellor said:
"As the greatest international traders in the world, we fully recog-
nise. the great importance to international trade of stability
exchange rates. In our opinion, the attainment of this object
must necessarily be attempted in two stages. The immediate
jective should be to secure approximate stability between the cur-
rencies of the principal countries of the world in order that trade
may not be hampered by violent and unpredictable fluctuations
of what I may call the basic currencies. This end will be achieved
in so far as the principal countries use their resources in order
to counteract fluctuations in the value of their currency caused by
temporary movements of capital rather than by fundamental eco-
nomic factors.
This first stage should be dealt with immediately. As regards
the second stage, the United Kingdom delegation endorse the
view that the ultimate aim of monetary policy should be the
restoration of a satisfactory international standard, and there is
no doubt that a gold standard seems to be generally acceptable.
The time and the exchange parity at which a return to gold could
safely be made, must, as was pointed out in the Annotated Agenda
prepared by the Preparatory Commission, fall to be determined
by the proper authorities in each country separately, but in order
that all countries may work harmoniously towards the same goal
I have no doubt that the conference would wish me to state, in
as positive and concrete terms as possible, the conditions under
which the United Kingdom would feel justified in returning to
the gold standard.
One of these conditions is a rise in the general levelthe
wholesale prices of commodities sufficient to restore equilibrium
between prices and costs.
A second condition is an adjustment of the factors which caused1282 DISINTEGRATION
the breakdown of the gold standard in the past and which, if not
corrected, would inevitably lead to a repetition of the process in
the future. These factors include, of course, the disturbances due
to reparations and war debt payments, and the obstacles to inter-
national trade caused by excessive tariffs, exchange restrictions,
and other abnormal impediments to the flow of commerce.
A third condition is that the gold standard shall in the future
be so administered that wide fluctuations in the purchasing power
of gold (in so far as they arise from monetary causes) will be to
the greatest possible extent prevented. Without entering in de-
tail into the question of the requisite reforms in the working of
the gold standard (in regard to which I hope that a substantial
measure of international agreement will be found to exist) I will
only mention three which seem to us essential, namely the with-
drawal of gold from internal circulation and its use only for
settlement of international balances; the reduction in the legal
minimum proportions of gold which central banks are required
to hold in their reserves; and a closer permanent co-operation be-
tween central banks." 11
Behindthese smoothly flowing periods was the hard deter-
mination of Great Britain to avoid any permanent com-
mitment on a rate of stabilization that might restore the eco-
nomic pressures experienced during the Defense of Sterling,
or sacrifice the briefly tasted sweets of a low rate of exchange.
On the other hand, there was clear appreciation that in a
contest for exchange depreciation with the dollar these sweets
might become bitter. In a central foreign exchange triangle
free to adjust itself in a three sided way, at least a temporary
accommodation had become extremely desirable.
At the time this Declaration was made, preliminary ne-
gotiations were still in progress between the British, the
American, and the French governments designed to permit
the Conference to approach its work in an atmosphere free
from unexpected shocks. These negotiations concerned war
debts, a tariff truce, and a temporary currency stabilization
for the duration of the Conference. The war debts question
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was shelved by the acceptance of token payments by
United States on the installments due on June 15 and
tariff truce was agreed upon by the principal powers. The de
facto currency stabilization negotiations brought
suggestions concerning the use of a "joint tri-partite equaliza-
tion fund" or alternatively the "operation of individual
ization mechanisms" upon cooperative lines, destined to bear
fruit later, but on the main issue the negotiations broke
down completely.
The fundamental reason for this breakdown, apart from
the question of the actual rate, which might have yielded to
compromise, was the great and unexpected success of the
Roosevelt Administration in raising prices in America.
tween February and June 1933 the Bureau of Labor Statistks
wholesale commodity price index rose 8.7 per cent. Withb
this index the greatest increases were in raw material prices.
Farm products rose per cent, hides and leather products
21.2 per cent, textile products 20.1 per cent, and foods 14
cent. In describing these changes the Federal Reserve Bulle-
tin for July '933 said (p. 416)
"In general, the widest price advances have occurred in raw mate-
rials. The demand for these primary products, which are gen-
erally quoted in organized markets and many of which enterr
actively into international trade, usually responds quickly to
changes in market conditions. Since February prices of these com-
modities have reflected increased demands, including forwardi
buying, accompanying sharp increases in industrial output and,
in the case of some agricultural commodities, prospects of reduced
supplies owing to weather conditions and proposed reductions
acreage. They have also been influenced by increased trading
the organized commodity markets in expectation of further price
advances, and, particularly in the case of international raw mate-
rials, by the change in the value of the dollar in the foreign ex-
change market."
During the stabilization negotiations an attempt was made
to persuade President Roosevelt to refrain from using the1284 DISINTEGRATION
powers granted by the Inflation Bill, on the ground that in-
flation in the United States would cause pressures on the ex-
changes that would break down any stabilization arrange-
ments. The converse of that argument, however, was that
stabilization arrangements would break down the American
attempt to raise prices by monetary means, and its force was
soon demonstrated by the behavior of the markets. On June
14 and 15 there were rumors that a stabilization agreement
had been reached, and as shown in Chart 8o, the dollar began
to appreciate at once. Security prices in New York fell and
commodity prices momentarily turned downward. The sta-
bilization negotiations were immediately broken off by Presi-
dent Roosevelt, and on June 22 the American delegation at
the Conference issued a statement:
"The American government at Washington finds that measures
of temporary stabilization now would be untimely. The reason
why it is considered untimely, is because the American govern-
ment feels that its efforts to raise prices are the most important
contribution it can make, and that anything that would interfere
with these efforts and possibly cause a violent price recession
would harm the conference more than the lack of an immediate
agreement for temporary stabilization." 12
Thesame sequence of events occurred once more before
the Conference ended. The dollar resumed its decline and
sterling reached 4.38 in New York on June 28. At that time a
final effort was made to reach a compromise on the stabiliza-
tion issue. A declaration of policy was drawn up advocating in
principle the restoration of the international gold standard as
an ultimate objective, but leaving each government free to
determine the time and the rate of its stabilization in gold.
This declaration recorded the common interest of all powers
in obtaining currency stability as quickly as possible and
pledged the signatories to a program of central bank coopera-
tion against exchange speculation. It was approved by the
delegates of the major powers, including those of the United
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States. When this became known the dollar once more began
to appreciate, but this time for a few days only.
The new declaration was submitted to President Roosevelt
on June 30 and on July 3 was rejected by him in a famous
message which brought the constructive labors of the Confer-
ence abruptly to an end. In this message Mr. Roosevelt
espoused the cause of a managed currency with stable pur-
chasing power in preference to a stable system of interna-
tional exchange rates. "Old fetishes of so-called international
bankers," he announced, "are being replaced by efforts to
plan national currencies with the objective of giving their
currencies a continuing purchasing power which does not
greatly vary in terms of commodities." Upon the publication
of this message, which contrasted strangely with Mr. Hoover's
references in April 1932 to the gold standard as "the Gibral-
tar of world stability," the dollar once more resumed its
decline in pounds and francs. This decline was broken in
July by the creation of a special demand for dollars in connec-
tion with the refunding of the United Kingdom 5½percent
dollar bonds due in 1937. Holders of the bonds were offered
the right to exchange them into £2. 10 5. per cent British
Treasury bonds of short maturity at the rate of £26 of the
sterling bonds for $ioo of the dollar bonds. At the prevailing
rates of exchange this was a very favorable offer and led to a
large scale repatriation of these bonds for purposes of con-
version. When the special demand for dollars arising from
this cause had spent its force, the decline of the dollar was
resumed, as shown in Chart 8o. This fresh decline, however,
was in francs rather than in sterling, for by that time the
central foreign exchange triangle had entered a new phase.
THE FOUR NEGATIVES OF THE CONFERENCE
This new phase began with the ending of the World Confer-
ence, which did not finally adjourn until July 27 though from
the moment of the receipt of President Roosevelt's message
of Julyit was clear that it could not accomplish constructive1286 DISINTEGRATION
results. The Conference split apart as the result of four great
negatives. The countries applying the new protection re-
fused to modify their systems of trade restriction unless cur-
rency stability was assured. The countries on the gold stand-
ard, many of which had had bitter experience of currency
inflation, refused to accept a policy of price raising as the
major instrument of economic reconstruction. Great Britain,
though favorable to price raising, refused to unbalance her
budget to achieve it or to embark upon a great program of
public works with that end in view. The United States re-
fused to allow her own program of price raising and of public
works to be interfered with by currency stabilization. The
counterpart of these negatives was a series of public affirma-
tions of currency policy which officially recognized the divi-
sion of the world into three distinct currency groups.
THE WORLD OF THE DOLLAR, THE WORLD OF GOLD, AND THE
WORLD OF STERLING
The first of these statements was the President's message to
the Conference of July 3. This had been preceded one month
before by the final legislative step in the process that took
America off the gold standard, the passage on June 5 of a
Joint Resolution by Congress abrogating the gold clause in
all contracts of debt in the United States, including those of
the government, and making all forms of money in the
United States, including Federal Reserve Notes, full legal
tender. On July 5 the American policy was formally put be-
fore the Conference in a declaration by the American delega-
tion:
"The revaluation of the dollar in terms of American commodities
is an end from which the government and the people of the
United States cannot be diverted. We wish to make this perfectly
clear: we are interested in American commodity prices. What is
to be the value of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies is not
and cannot be our immediate concern. The exchange value of
the dollar will ultimately depend upon the success of other na-WHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1287
Lions in raising the prices of their own commodities in terms of
their national moneys and cannot be determined in advance of
our knowledge of such fact. There is nothing in our policy inimi-
cal to the interest of any other country and we are confident that
no other country would seek to embarrass us in the attainment of
economic ends required for our economic health." 13
Noattempt was made to regulate the dollar exchange. The
Administration pressed forward a program of price raising
through three major instruments of policy, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and
credit expansion. In April 1933openmarket purchases had
been resumed on a large scale. By January 1934 government
bonds held by the twelve Federal Reserve banks had in-
creased million, bills discounted and bills bought had
fallen $345 million, and the excess reserves of the member
banks had risen $487 million, reaching the large total of $866
million.
The final rejection of exchange stabilization by the United
States in order to pursue this policy unchecked was immedi-
ately followed by the definite joining together of the gold
standard countries under the leadership of France in a group
known as the gold bloc. Upon the receipt of the President's
message of July 3 the representatives of France, the Nether-
lands, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and Poland issued the fol-
lowing statement:
"The undersigned governments, convinced that the maintenance
of their currencies is essential for the economic and financial re-
covery of the world and of credit and for the safeguarding of
social progress in their respective countries, confirm their inten-
tion to maintain the free functioning of the gold standard in
their respective countries at the existing gold parities and within
the framework of existing monetary laws. They ask their central
banks to keep in close touch to give the maximum efficacy to this
declaration." 14
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On July 8 the heads of the central banks of these countries
met in Paris to make plans for close inter-central bank co-
operation to combat speculation in their currencies.
Finally, on the day of the adjournment of the World Con-
ference the de facto grouping of the sterling countries about
the pound was officially recognized, as far as the countries of
the British Empire were concerned, by a British Empire Cur-
rency Declaration. This declaration was careful to avoid any
commitment on the relation between the sterling countries
and the French franc. With respect to the relations between
the sterling countries it read in part:
"The undersigned delegations now reaffirm their view that the
ultimate aim of monetary policy should be the restoration of a
satisfactory international gold standard under which interna-
tional cooperation would be secured and maintained with a view
to avoiding, so far as may be found practicable, undue fluctua-
tions in the purchasing power of gold. The problem with which
the world is faced is to reconcile the stability of exchange rates
with a reasonable measure of stability, not merely in the price
level of a particular country, but in world prices. Effective action
in this matter must largely depend on international, cooperation,
and in any further sessions of the World Economic and Monetary
Conference this subject must have special prominence.
In the meantime the undersigned delegations recognize the im-
portance of stability of exchange rates between the countries of
the Empire in the interests of trade. This objective will be con-
stantly kept in mind in determining their monetary policy, and
its achievement will be aided by the pursuit of a common policy
of raising price levels. Inter-Imperial stability of exchange rates
is facilitated by the fact that the United Kingdom Government
has no commitments to other countries as regards the future man-
agement of sterling and retains complete freedom of action in
this respect. The adherence of other countries to a policy on simi-
lar lines would make possible the attainment of exchange stabil-
ity over a still wider area."
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No machinery was set up for the execution of this program.
Each government concerned and its central bank merely
undertook to pursue the policy appropriate to maintaining
stable exchange relations with the pound sterling. No tech-
nique was laid down in advance for the administration of
their currencies. None was necessary, for techniques long
established by tradition and custom were already available.
The invitation to other countries to join in this de facto
grouping was soon accepted by Sweden, Denmark, and Argen-
tina.1°
A Three-Cornered Adjustment
With the formal breaking up of the international gold stand-
ard system into its three constituent elements in July
the effort to bind two of them, the sterling and gold groups,
together by pegging the sterling-franc exchange was relaxed.
Almost from the beginning it had encountered great difficul-
ties, which for the most part originated in the United States.
THE ADOPTION OF A MIDDLE OF THE ROAD POLICY BY ENGLAND
WITH RESPECT TO THE FRANC
Ever since April 1933 there had been a fairly steady exodus
of European capital from the New York market. From the
beginning of President Roosevelt's monetary experiments the
continent took a pessimistic view of the future of the dollar.
French, Belgian, and Dutch interests sold dollar bonds and
remitted the proceeds home through London with the effects
noted, in the case of France, in our examination of the dol-
lar-franc rate. The London market was obliged to absorb the
dollars and find the required continental currencies. As the
dollar depreciated, moreover, powerful British export inter-
ests, and certain parts of the Empire exerted pressure upon
the authorities to abandon the de facto franc stabilization
and secure relief from the new American competition by
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allowing the pound to depreciate in terms of francs. This
caused mounting uncertainty whether this de facto stabiliza-
tion would continue and speculative transactions added to
the weakness of the pound. In addition, the speculative mar-
kets were fully aware that large holdings of mobile funds
which had been sent to London as a place of refuge might be
suddenly withdrawn if sterling developed real weakness. This
constituted a further reason for taking a speculative position
against the pound.
As a consequence, the British Exchange Equalization Ac-
count was obliged to enter the market on a large scale as a
seller of francs, and a rate of 86 francs to the pound was
maintained wholly by artificial means. It was represented to
the writer by sources close to the market for francs in London
that during June, July, and the first part of August the Equal-
ization Account was for long periods almost the sole seller of
francs, and one important trader stated that there were only
two days from early in June to early in August when 'natural'
sellers were in the market. The francs sold by the Account
were obtained partly from the portfolio accumulated in April
when the franc was being supported, partly by the building
up of sterling balances by the French government during
July for the repayment of the French Treasury credit,'7 and
partly by the sale and pledge of gold in France. There were
at least two clear indications of these gold operations. First,
during July and the first part of August gold moved in large
quantities from New York to London. It was known that the
French supplies of earmarked gold in New York had been
repatriated in 1932, and these shipments were undoubtedly
from gold earmarked in the United States by the Exchange
Equalization Account and now sold in France to help sup-
port the pound.'8 Second, gold was coming to the London
17 Cf. Ch.The Credit Base, and Chart 73 showing a sudden increase in
accounts' at the Bank of England in July; also Samuel Montagu & Co.,
Weekly Review, Aug.
Barrons Weekly, Aug. 7, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Aug.
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market for sale in amounts far greater than the increniients
that appeared on the balance sheets of either the Bank
England or the Bank of France. The British control was
ding for gold regularly in the market at a price above the
franc parity price, taking what it needed, often as much as
£600,000per week, and allowing the French bid to take the
rest. It was assumed by the London exchange market that
this gold, whether held in London or in France, was by
arrangement used to provide the Equalization Account with
francs with which to meet the steady market demand.
These operations in the gold market had one curious polk.
ical aspect. The British Empire was on the whole strongly
opposed to the policy of holding the sterling-franc rate at 86
francs to the pound, and was eager to have the sterling cmun-
tries follow the United States in its general price raising
policy, but the Empire provided the gold by which the policy
to which it was opposed was carried out. It is not the functiori
of these studies to probe political motives, but, as in the case
of German policy in itis sometimes necessary to
briefly on the hidden springs of action in order to see clearly
the course of events. It is therefore suggested that the opening
of the London market to an Australian refunding loan
the £15millionCanadian government loan of the summer
1933
20may have been in a sense a price paid by England to
secure the adhesion of those two countries to the British
Empire Currency Declaration without sacrificing the de facto
stabilization of the pound in terms of the franc.
By the middle of August the pressure on sterling had be-
come very severe. The sterling-dollar rate had fallen from
4.84on July 19 to 4.40 on August i6 while the sterling-franc
rate had been pegged at about 85. One way out of the ex-
change difficulties would have been to further drastically
depreciate sterling in dollars, while the franc rate was main-
19 Cf. Ch. 16, The Retreat from the Principle of Stopping Inflation,
1928.
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tamed; the other, to give up all thought of pegging the ster-
ling-franc rate and to allow the market to find a new equilib-
rium. Quiet feelers were put out in the exchange market by
the authorities to ascertain how much sterling would have to
be sold to bring about a depreciation of sterling sufficient to
restore the relative positions existing in April 1933. No
drastic action of either kind was taken. A traditional British
middle of the road policy began to assert itself and it seemed
likely that the Equalization Account would relax its support
of the pound in Paris sufficiently to allow continental ex-
change operations and seasonal influences to have their effect
upon the exchanges. Toward the middle of August sterling
was under severe pressure from insistent offers by the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Switzerland for the purpose of replacing
sterling investments at sight or short notice by investments
in gold currencies or in gold.2' These came on a generally
weak market, and sterling for the first time since lat•e April
declined sharply in Paris. At the same time renewed rumors
of further inflation in the United States caused a sharp
depreciation of the dollar which fell in London from 4.50 on
August 22 to 4.62 on August 26. The necessary adjustment in
the triangular system was worked out by an even more rapid
decline of the dollar in Paris (Chart 80).Anextremely com-
plicated balance came into existence between the interest of
Great Britain in diminishing the foreign exchange advantage
then being acquired by American exporters and the disad-
vantages of placing the gold countries under further strain
by a still greater overvaluation of their currencies, not only
in dollars but also in sterling. In the three cornered, relatively
free adjustment now taking place within the triangle, the
effect of further speculative dealings and capital flight from
America as rumors of fresh inflationary measures gained
strength was dominant. In the week of September ii—i6
sterling rose in New York from 4.55 to 4.70 and on the i6th
21L'In formation, Paris, quoted in Samuel Montagu & Co., Weekly Review,
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suddenly jumped to 4.80. As shown in Chart 8o the pound at
the same time fell somewhat in Paris, and the decline of the
dollar in Paris continued to be greater than in London.
The price of gold in London rose to over i 30 s. early in
September and on September 22 reached 133 S. 7 d., reflecting
in its higher level and irregular movements the strains im-
posed upon the connecting link between the great sterling
and gold groups of countries.
In the last quarter of 1933 the sterling-franc rate was
subjected to a very remarkable set of conflicting forces. In
October a fiscal crisis, long in the making, came to a head in
France. During the early part of the depression France had
enjoyed a relative immunity from deflationary forces experi-
enced by other countries owing partly to her more nearly bal-
anced internal economic structure and partly to her ability to
export a portion of her unemployment through restricting
the seasonal movement of labor into southern France from
Spain, Italy, and other countries.22 This immunity ceased
with the decline of sterling. In spite of the extreme agricul-
tural protection practiced in France, the use on a large scale
of the quota system, and the maintenance of relatively stable
retail prices, there was a steady deflationary pressure after
1931, which, in the words of Charles Rist, was "aggravated by
every fall in the pound sterling."23 National income declined
and budget calculations were upset. Government income was
reduced and government expenditures increased. By Septem-
ber a cumulative budget deficit had been built up
amounting to 40 milliard francs according to the calculations
of Mm. Caillaux and Cheron. Of this, onlymilliard had
been covered by long term bonds, and 25 milliard by increases
in the short term debt. This was exclusive of the mounting
deficits of the French railways. In spite of the urgency of the
fiscal need, strong opposition was encountered by the gov-
Cf. Ohlin, Course and Phases of the World Depression, pp. 234—5, and
I'Vorld Economic Survey, 1932/3, pp.53—4.
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ernment in its efforts to pass its budget through the French
Chamber of Deputies in October, and as a result the direction
of the international capital flow was reversed. Foreign funds
seeking employment in London increased, enquiry for ster-
ling bills from foreign sources was strong, and a capital flow
into the United States began. The dollar appreciated in both
Paris and London, but since the pound also was rising in
Paris, the dollar rose faster in Paris than in London. These
movements were the reverse of the three cornered adjust-
ments of late August and mid-September, and restored the
triangular system approximately to the position prevailing in
the middle of August (Chart 80). At this moment, however,
an entirely new and powerful factor entered the situation in
the form of a further development of American monetary
policy.
EFFECT OF THE AMERICAN GOLD BUYING POLICY ON THE TRI-
ANGLE
On August 28, the executive orders issued by President
Roosevelt on April 5 and 20 regulating transactions in gold
and prohibiting gold hoarding were replaced by a new com-
prehensive regulation, and on the next day the Secretary of
the Treasury was authorized to receive all newly mined gold
Of domestic origin. Beginning September 8 the Treasury
bought all such gold at a price equal to the highest price in
any free gold market. Purchases were made during September
and October at prices ranging from $29.10 to On
October iS, 1933 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York re-
duced its discount rate from 2½ to 2 per cent, partly in an
effort to check the inflow of capital and partly as a further
step in the general credit expansion program of the govern-
ment. Four days later Presidenç Roosevelt announced by
radio a new gold policy for the United States. The portions
24J. D. Paris, Monetary Policies of the United States, 1932—1938(Columbia
University Press, pp. 2 1—5,especiallythe chart on p. 22, showing the
prices paid for gold by the United States government, Sept. 1933—Jan. 1934.WHO IS SOVEREIGN?
of this famous speech bearing directly upon monetary polIcy
were:
"Finally, I repeat what I have said on many occasions, that ever
since last March the definite policy of the government has seen
to restore commodity price levels.
The object has been the attainment of such a level as will en-
able agriculture and industry once more to give work to the un-
employed.
It has been to make possible the payment of public and private
debts more nearly at the price level at which they were incurred.
It has been gradually to restore a balance in the price structure
so that farmers may exchange their products for the products
industry on a fairer exchange basis.
It has been and is also the purpose to prevent prices from rising
beyond the point necessary to attain these ends. The permanent
welfare and security of every class of our people ultimately die-
pends on our attainment of these purposes.
Obviously, and because hundreds of different kinds of crops
and industrial occupations in the huge territory that makes UT'J
thisnation are involved, we cannot reach the goal in only a few
months. We may take one year or two years or three years.
No one who considers the plain facts of our situation believes
that commodity prices, especially agricultural prices, are high
enough yet.
Some people are putting the cart before the horse. They want
a permanent revaluation of the dollar first. It is the government's
policy to restore the price level first. I would not know, and no
one else could tell, just what the permanent valuation of the
dollar will be. To guess at a permanent gold valuation now
would certainly require later changes caused by later facts.
When we have restored the price level, we shall seek to cstab-
lish and maintain a dollar which will not change its purchasing
and debt-paying power during the succeeding generation. I said
that in my message to the American delegation in London last
July. And I say it now once more.
Because of conditions in this country and because of events be•
yond our control in other parts of the world, it becomes
ingly important to develop and apply the further measures which1296 DISINTEGRATION
may be necessary from time to time to control the gold value of
our own dollar at home.
Our dollar is now altogether too greatly influenced by the ac-
cidents of international trade, by the internal policies of other
nations and by political disturbances in other continents.
Therefore the United States must take firmly in its own hands
the control of the gold value of our dollar. This is necessary in
order to prevent dollar disturbances from swinging us away from
our ultimate goal, namely, the continued recovery of our com-
modity prices.
As a further effective means to this end, I am going to establish
a government market for gold in the United States. Therefore,
under the clearly defined authority of existing law, I am au-
thorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to buy gold
newly mined in the United States at prices to be determined from
time to time after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury
and the President. Whenever necessary to the end in view, we
shall also buy or sell gold in the world market.
My aim in taking this step is to establish and maintain con-
tinuOus control. This is a policy and not an expedient." 25
Thedriving force behind this policy was quite clearly not
a fine spun academic theory concerning the relations between
the price of gold, the value of gold, and the price level of
commodities. It is found in the simple statement that "no
one who considers the plain facts of our situation believes
that commodity prices, especially agricultural prices, are high
enough yet." The general level of American prices was still
29 per cent under the 1926 price level, the restoration of
which was the announced goal of the Administration. Far
more important, as a factor in American politics, the rela-
tively rapid rise in agricultural prices, which had accom-
panied the first depreciation of the dollar, had ended, as
shown in the accompanying table. The primary object of
the new policy was to raise farm prices by forcing a still fur-
25Ibid.,Ap. B, pp. 168—9. Paris gives a series of extracts from laws, proclama-
tions, and other documents bearing on American monetary policy.Cf.
Pasvolsky, cit.)pp. i88—g.WHO IS SOVEREIGN? L297
ther depreciation of the dollar in the foreign exchange mar-
kets.
To carry out this policy the purchase of domestically mined
gold was transferred to the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion from the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve banks were
authorized to purchase gold abroad for the account oE the
BLS Index of Wholesale Prices, 1933
(1g26=ioo)
MARCH JULY OCTOBER
Allcommodities 60.2 68.g 71.2
Farmproducts 42.8 6o.i 55.7
Foods 54.6 65.5 64.2
Other commodities 65.5 72.2 77.2
Reconstruction Finance Corporation after November i. The
initial purchases of the Corporation on October 25 were made
at $31.36, a price slightly above the dollar equivalent of the
world price on that day at the existing exchange rates. As this
price was gradually raised during the next few days the for-
eign exchange rates followed, largely under the influence of
speculative purchases in anticipation of a devaluation of the
dollar at approximately the gold content indicated by the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation price. Furthermore, it
was quite clear that the United States would not allow its
new buying prices for gold to be disregarded by the ex-
change market by confining its purchases to domestic gold.
On October 29 the President announced his intention of SOOTII
entering the world market for gold, and on November 2 the
first purchases were made in Paris. The foreign purchases
were carried out cautiously and on a moderate scale, but the
American buying price was raised almost daily for over a
month. On December i the price reached $34.01. The dollar
began a violent depreciation in both pounds and francs, reach-
ing $5.50 in London and 6.52 1 cents in Paris on November
i6. At this time the market heard rumors of an impending
stabilization operation, and as a result of a reversal of
lative positions the dollar began to rise. The closing rates fin1298 DISINTEGRATION
November were $5.18 for sterling and 5.91centsfor francs.
At the point of extreme dollar depreciation the American
buying price was lower than the dollar equivalent of the
world price, and at the end of the month it was higher.
The launching of the American gold buying policy caused
an extraordinarily complicated adjustment in the foreign ex-
changes. There was a curious meeting in the markets of weak-
ness in the franc, due to political and financial developments
in France, and weakness in the dollar, due to the American
gold buying policy. If at any time the Federal Reserve banks
offered to buy gold at a price in dollars higher than the
equivalent of the London market price at the existing sterling-
dollar exchange, then their bid was competitive not only in
London but also at the Bank of France, because the London
price of gold was based fundamentally on the buying price of
the Bank of France and the existing sterling-franc exchange.
Consequently, either the sterling-dollar rate or the sterling-
franc rate, or both, had to adjust themselves to this situation
or the Bank of France would lose gold. There could no longer
be a wholly free three cornered adjustment throughout the
triangle. The American gold bid fixed, for the moment, a
new parity between the franc and the dollar, below which
the dollar-franc rate could not fall without the Bank of France
losing gold to the United States. The dollar-franc rate could
no longer exhibit in the same degree as before the characteris-
tics of a cross rate. It was dominated by the American buying
price for gold.
If the American buying price had been a standing offer to
take all gold offered at the price fixed, the fluctuations in the
dollar-franc rate would have been confined within new gold
points. The adjustments in the sterling-dollar and sterling-
franc rates would have had to be in the nature of a common
movement of sterling in both francs and dollars. 'The be-
havior of the triangle from October 25, 1933tothe middle
of February 1934wasintermediate between this situation
and that of the free three sided adjustment prevailing fromWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1299
mid-Augustto mid-October TheAmerican bid for gold
was not fixed and unlimited, and the point at which it would
become so was unknown. There was therefore ample room
for deviations in the dollar-franc rate from the path marked
out for it by the American gold price. Yet a path was marked
out, which in general the franc had to follow, and in spite of
great underlying weakness the franc appreciated in New
York. Since no path was marked out for sterling, there was
also room for considerable change in the relationships of the
three rates. This continued to be true as long as the American
gold policy was in its formative stages. Only gradually was a
common movement in francs and dollars imposed on sterling,
but this was the inevitable final result of the completion
the American program by a definitive devaluation of the
dollar, and the continued determination of France to remain
on the gold standard without changing the gold content of:
the franc. This determination was reiterated by M. Bonnet
in an official statement during the October crisis.
From the middle of October to the middle of Decembe:
gold moved steadily from France to England in support of
the franc. In large measure this was gold previously pledged
by the British Equalization Account against francs needed to
support the pound. Since it thus represented in the main a
reversal of an exchange stabilization operation this gold loss
did not cause great anxiety in France.26 Nevertheless, as
shown in Chart 58, it reduced the gold holdings of the Bank
of France below the level of the preceding April. At the
same time almost the last remaining foreign exchange hold..
ings of the Bank were given up. In spite of this support the
franc depreciated steadily in London during November, and
at the end of the month stood at 84.47, just under the level
of the pegging operations of the preceding summer. Since the
franc was at the same time rising in New York, the triangular
adjustment was completed, under the play of arbitrage trans..
actions, by a more rapid rise of the pound in New York than.
26Mocattaand Goldsmid, Annual Circular, 1933,p. 4.1300 DISINTEGRATION
in Paris (shown in Chart 8o by the drawing together of the
sterling-dollar and the dollar-franc lines)
From December i to 18 the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration gold price remained at $34.01 and on December i8 was
raised to $34.06. It was not changed again until January i6,
1934,whenthe execution of the program was transferred to
the Federal Reserve banks and the price was raised to
Thisresulted in fluctuations of the dollar-franc rate about a
general level of just over six cents to the franc. Since the
sterling-franc rate also was kept stable the exchanges of the
world enjoyed a brief period of relative calm. President
Roosevelt had again expressed the view that the time was
not yet ripe for stabilization, and the exchange markets were
dull and inactive. This situation was abruptly terminated
by the devaluation of the American dollar.
The Triangle in 1934, Unbalanced and without a Point
of Reference for Future Stabilization
The Devaluation of the Dollar
On January 15,1934President Roosevelt requested Congress
to give him power to define the gold content of the dollar at
not over 6ô per cent of its former weight. Under the Inflation
Act he already had authority to fix the gold content as low as
50 per cent of its former weight. He requested Congress also
to vest the title of all gold in the United States in the govern-
ment in order to accomplish three purposes. The first was to
complete the legal process by which the United States had
given up the use of gold as a circulating medium. In the
words of the President's message, it had become clear that
the free circulation of gold coins was unnecessary, led to
hoarding, and tended to a possible weakening of national
financial structures in time of emergency. The second purpose
was a corollary of the first, to confine the transfer of gold
bullion to the purpose of settling international balances. The
third was, again in the President's words, to make clear the
government ownership of any added dollar value of theWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1301
country's gold stock that would result from any decrease in
the gold content of the dollar. As a corollary of this, the gov-
ernment would be obliged to bear the loss of any future in-
crease in the gold content of the dollar. The President re-
quested also that, in order to bring some further stability into
the foreign exchanges, the Treasury be granted, in addition
to its existing power to buy and sell gold, the power to deai
in the foreign exchanges, and that it should be given, out of
the profits of dollar devaluation, a fund of $2 billion "for
such purchases and sales of gold, foreign exchange and gov..
ernment securities as the regulation of the currency, the
maintenance of the credit of the government and the general
welfare of the United States" might require.27
On the same day a series of Treasury Regulations were is-
sued under the emergency powers granted during the March
1933 CT1S1S that made every transaction in the foreign ex-
changes, the transfer of credit between any banking institu-
tion within and outside the United States, and the export
any legal tender currency from the United States subject to
Treasury license, except foreign exchange transactions for
normal business requirements, for reasonable traveling ex-
penses, and in fulfilment of contracts entered into before
March g, 1933. These regulations gave large reserve powers
to the Treasury, including the right to prohibit any foreign
exchange transactions and to require that complete informa-
tion concerning every sort of foreign exchange transaction be
made available to it. They restored the system of exchange
restriction in force on March io, 1933 28 and were part of the
armory with which the government placed itself in a position
to enforce its wishes concerning the foreign exchanges. On
the following day the function of buying gold of domestic
origin was taken over by the Federal Reserve banks from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the price being fixed
at $34.45perounce, and on Januarythe President's recom-
27 Federal Reserve Bulletin, Feb. 1933, pp.62—3.
28 Executive Order 6560, Jan.15,'934 (ibid., Feb. 1934, p.78).1302 DISINTEGRATION
mendations were made law by the passage of the Gold Re-
serve Act of 1934.
This act fixed the upper limit of devaluation at 6o per cent
of the former weight of the gold dollar; it transferred the
ownership of the gold held by the Federal Reserve system to
the government, and provided that the Federal Reserve banks
should receive for that gold deposits with the Treasury of an
equivalent amount in dollars payable in gold certificates, thus
leaving the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve banks un-
changed except that in all their gold items gold certificates
appeared in place of gold; it prohibited the coinage of gold
and directed the melting into bars of all gold coins in the
United States; it gave the Secretary of the Treasury power to
buy gold in any amount and to issue bonds in payment
thereof, and to "sell gold in any amounts at home and abroad,
in such manner, and at such rates and upon such terms and
conditions as he might deem most advantageous to the public
interest"; and it appropriated $2 billion from the profits of
the devaluation as a stabilization fund under the exclusive
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, subject to the
President's approval, and provided that the decisions of the
Secretary in administering the fund should be final and not
subject to review by any other officer of the United States.
The machinery by which the United States became once
more a member of the gold standard world was provided for
by the following passages in the Act (ibid., pp. 64—6)
"The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed
to receive deposits of gold and gold certificates with the Treasurer
or Assistant Treasurer of the United States when tendered by any
Federal Reserve bank or Federal Reserve Agent for credit to its
or his account with the Federal Reserve Board.... Depositsso
made shall be held subject to the orders of the Federal Reserve
Board, and shall be payable in gold certificates on the order of the
Federal Reserve Board to any Federal Reserve Bank or Federal
Reserve Agent...
'Depositsmade under this section standing to the credit of anyWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1303
Federal Reserve Bank with the Federal Reserve Board shall, at
the option of said bank, be counted as part of the lawful reserve
which it is required to maintain against outstanding Federal Re-
serve notes, or as a part of the reserve it is required to maintain
against deposits.'
The Secretary of the Treasury shall, by regulations issued here-
under, with the approval of the President, prescribe the condi-
tions under which gold may be acquired and held, transported,
melted or treated, imported, exported, or earmarked:(a)for
industrial, professional, and artistic use; (b) by the Federal Re-
serve banks for the purpose of settling international balances;
and,(c)for such other purposes as in his judgment are not in-
consistent with the purposes of this Act. Gold in any form may be
acquired, transported, melted or treated, imported, exported, or
earmarked or held in custody for foreign or domestic account
(except on behalf of the United States) only to the extent per-
mitted by, and subject to the conditions prescribed in, or pur-
suant to, such regulations."
The form of gold bullion standard established by this Act
may be described as an 'administrative international gold bul-
lion standard,' for it laid upon the Federal Reserve banks and
the Treasury no compulsion of law either to buy or sell gold.
A simple exercise by the Secretary of the Treasury of the
permissive powers granted to him to buy or sell gold, or a
simple Treasury regulation permitting the Federal Reserve
banks to import or export gold for the purposes of settling
international balances was all that was required to establish
a temporary and effective gold parity between the dollar and
other gold standard currencies. A simple failure to exercise
these powers, or a simple regulation restricting the right of
the Reserve banks to export or import gold was all that was
required to break down this connection. Nothing in the terms
of the act required that gold, if bought or sold by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, shoNid be bought or sold at a price cor-
responding to the gold content of the dollar as defined, within
the limits laid down by Congress, by presidential proclama-
tion.1304 DISINTEGRATION
On Januaryi the President, by proclamation, fixed the
weight of the gold dollar at '5%i grains of gold fine, or
59.06 per cent of the former weight of 258/10 grains, specifi-
cally reserving, however, the right to alter this definition
within the io per cent range permitted by Congress at some
future date. On February ithe Secretary of the Treasury,
with the President's approval, announced that he would buy
through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal
agent for the Treasury, all gold delivered to the United
States mints at $35 per ounce. The Treasury undertook also
to sell gold for export to foreign central banks whenever the
dollar exchange with other gold standard currencies reached
gold export point. As long as these undertakings were ob-
served there was a place for private gold arbitrage for both
export and import in the new system.29 In addition, the Fed-
eral Reserve banks were given a certain scope for the exercise
of initiative in the export and import of gold for the purposes
of regulating the exchanges. The first rulings under the Gold
Reserve Act issued on January 31 provided that the Federal
Reserve banks might acquire gold bullion from the United
States in such amounts as in the judgment of the Secretary
of the Treasury were necessary to settle international balances
or to maintain the equal purchasing power of every kind of
currency in the United States. For the same purposes the
Federal Reserve banks were also permitted to acquire gold
abroad or gold lawfully held in the United States (e.g., for in-
dustrial purposes) ,andto hold, transport, import, export, or
earmark such gold or to hold it in custody for foreign or do-
mestic account. This freedom of dealing in, importing, and
reexporting gold was, however, limited by a provision giving
the Treasury the right to take over such gold if it was not used
for the purposes designated within six
29 On October 12, 1936 gold arbitrage for export ceased by administrative
ruling of the Treasury, following the Tripartite Monetary Agreement be-
tween France, Great Britain, and the tJnited States; cE. Paris, op. cit., pp. 36—7.
80 Regulations issued under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, sec. 28, 29 (Federal
Reserve Bulletin, Feb. 1934,p.86).WHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1305
TheGreat American Gold Magnet
The adjustment of the central foreign exchange triangle to
the establishment of a new dollar parity with the gold cur-
rencies was slow and painful. Immediately following the
President's message to Congress on January 15 American
funds were repatriated from London and the continent. Ster-
ling declined from 5.15 on January 15 to 4.95 Ofl January iS
and remained at a range of slightly under 5.00 for the rest
the month. American gold purchases, however, supported the
franc, which appreciated in dollars. This appreciation was
not sufficient to bring the dollar-franc rate to the level in-
dicated by the Federal Reserve buying price for gold and it
was clear that the Federal Reserve banks were not taking all
the gold offered to them at that price. Since the dollar
falling in Paris but rising in London the franc had to rise in
London. On January i8 the sterling-franc rate reached 79.72
francs to the pound and the London price of gold rose to
132 S. 10 d.
The failure of the dollar-franc rate to adjust itself even to
the American gold price of $34.45 per ounce, which prevailed
from January i6 to February i, meant that when the Ameri-
can bid was changed into a standing offer to buy all gold
presented at an ounce on February i, extraordinary
arbitrage profits were opened to private interests. The private
gold arbitrageurs were encouraged to take advantage of these
literally golden opportunities and an extraordinary move-
ment of gold into the United States resulted. The situation is
described by Samuel Montagu and Company in their Annual
Bullion Letter, 1934:
"Thedrastic alteration in the United States Treasury gold price,
made as it was for reasons of internal economics rather than be-
cause of any weakness in the world value of the dollar, created
opportunities for gold arbitrage with the United States of Amer-
ica on a scale, and with a margin of profit, hitherto beyond the
wildest dreams of the arbitrageur.1306 DISINTEGRATION
Immediately following the announcement, substantial ship-
ments were arranged by the next available steamers leaving Eu-
rope for New York. For a few days, however, many operators held
back, there being considerable speculation as to the exact nature
of the new conditions attaching to the purchase of gold. When it
was realized without doubt that the United States were again
back on an effective gold standard and willing to take all gold
tendered from abroad at the new statutory rate, a flow of gold
commenced to that country which quickly assumed flood propor-
tions, only abating towards the end of February.
Never before has such a huge movement of gold taken place in
so short a time. Accommodation on all mail steamers was booked
well ahead and many other vessels other than the regular liners
were pressed into service as bullion carriers. The demand for in-
surance caused premiums to rise sharply and as much as 20s. per
cent. was paid on occasion, compared with the normal market
rate of is. per cent. Indeed it was the difficulty of placing insur-
ance beyond certain amounts on any one steamer that limited the
consignments carried, rather than shortage of space in vessels.
The United States Treasury officials were overwhelmed by the
inrush and at first there was considerable delay in making settle-
ment for gold tendered."
At the new valuation of perounce these imports
amounted in February alone to $454 million, of which $239
million came from London and $124 million from France.
The gold losses of the Bank of France during the month were
over 3 milliard francs and American demand carried all be-
fore it in the London market. Under this tremendous sup-
port both sterling and francs rose substantially in dollars, but
the adjustment of the dollar-franc rate to the new parity was
delayed by the underlying weakness of the franc. Just at this
time political difficulties in France reached their peak in the
Stavisky affair and in the riots in Bayonne and elsewhere
which immediately preceded the formation of the Dou-
mergue Cabinet on February io. Not until the middle of
February did the franc reach approximately the new parity
with the dollar of 6.635 cents per franc. On February i6 itWHO IS SOVEREIGN?
was 6.54 cents and by the end of the month had worked up
to 6.572 cents. In March, however, the settlement of French
political difficulties resulted in a repatriation of capital, and
this, together with an improvement in the balance of trade,
supported the exchange and enabled the Bank of France to
recover during the next six months all its gold losses since
1932 (Chart 58). The rise of sterling in New York during
February was almost but not quite as great as that of the
franc, and as a result the sterling-franc rate reached a level
just over 77 francs to the pound.
With these adjustments in the central foreign exchange
triangle a new and relatively stable system of rates was es-
tablished, shown in Chart 8o by the straightening out of the
three foreign exchange rate lines—the franc-dollar rate
around the level of 6.5 cents to the franc, the sterling-franc
rate around the level of 77 francs to the pound, and the
dollar-sterling rate around the level of 5.10 dollars to the
pound. In this system the dollar-franc rate was fixed and the
other two rates were consequently obliged to move together.
If the new dollar-franc parity did not at the time it was first
fixed represent an appropriate rate of stabilization, or by a
subsequent movement of prices in the various countries come
soon to represent such an appropriate rate, then the system,
though externally more stable, was inherently more unstable
than during the summer of 1933 when a free adjustment of
all the rates was possible. With the stabilization of the least
important of the three legs of the triangle, leaving the most
important legs to find some compromise adjustment, an
underlying chronic state of strain was introduced. The most
spectacular evidence that this was actually the case was the
reappearance of the United States as a great magnet for the
world's goki.
At the conclusion of our description of the impact of the
world depression upon the United States we stated that its
power to attract gold was still growing, while that of France
was at its zenith(cf. Ch. 27). During 1932 the spectacular13o8 DISINTEGRATION
powers of France were exerted to their fullest extent, and un-
til autumn 1933 they were reinforced and strengthened by
the events just described. The financial crisis of October
1933, however, revealed the fundamental fact that the great
pull over the world's exchanges exercised by France since
1926 had run its course. This meant that the basically tri-
angular pattern of the world's central exchanges was modified
in character and that for the future the adjustments in the
world's system of exchange rates would have to be adjust-
ments to the sterling-dollar rate, rather than to the sterling-
dollar-franc system of rates. Such an underlying shift in the
center of gravity of the world's exchanges was not and could
not be sudden. It was not spectacular and not absolute, but
beneath all the extraordinary events of the next few years it
remained an underlying influence of ever growing impor-
tance.
The items in the French international balance for 1932—
aspresented in Table 76, show that in 1932 the inflow of
short term capital into France was reduced from the extra-
ordinary 1931 figure of 25.8 milliard francs to 2 milliard, but
that the long term capital movement was inward to the ex-
tent of 6.4 milliard as compared with a net outward move-
ment in of 2.1 milliard. Consequently, in 1932 France
was able to meet an adverse balance of merchandise trade and
current invisibles of 5.9 milliard in spite of the final end of
reparation receipts and a decline in her income from invest-
ments abroad, and still absorb 3.8 milliard of new foreign
issues. Her great gold import of '7.7 milliard was almost
exactly the equivalent of the sales of foreign exchange by the
Treasury and the Bank of France and was essentially a con-
version operation. In 1933theFrench import surplus on
merchandise and current invisible account continued its de-
cline with the general shrinkage in international trade, but
for the year capital movements were outward to the extent of
1.3milliard.This was the net result of the inward movement
during the summer and the outward movement after the fiscalWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1309
crisis in October. Consequently, for the year as a whole the
Treasury and the Bank of France had to draw upon their re-
maining foreign exchange holdings to the extent of 3.6 mu-
hard and to export gold to the extent of 2 milliard. In 1934
capitalmovements, gold movements, and official dealings in
foreign exchange played relatively minor roles in establish-
ing the balance in France's international payments which
was worked out chiefly through a still further decline in her
import surplus and an increase in her return from foreign
investment.
In contrast, capital movements began to play an ever in-
creasing role in the American balance of payments after i
Merchandisetrade and current invisibles other than interest
and dividends showed a decreasing net debit balance from
1931to1933, but from to 1935 this part of the American
balance of payments was in an approximate balance (Table
.Thenet credit from interest and dividend payments also
declined from 1931 to 1933,butfrom then on was relatively
stable. From 1931to1933 the net inward movement of long
term capital other than new issues also declined, but still
showed a credit balance even in 1933notwithstandingthe
large repatriations of foreign capital. In 1934itbegan to
grow and in 1935wasonce more very substantial. Conse-
quently there were net export surpluses of over million
in 1932 and $274millionin 1933asa result of the current
transactions of the country in goods and services, the receipt
of payment on past investment abroad, and the dealings of
the securities markets, other than new issues. In 1934and
1935thisexport surplus rose to $663 million and $689 mil-
lion, respectively, as the influences that had reduced the in-
flow of long term capital were removed and investment in
America was encouraged by the cheapening of the dollar.
America thus exercised a strong basic pull over the exchanges
even when the monetary policy of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion was forcing a depreciation of the dollar. New foreign is-
sues had virtually ceased and on April 5, 1934 the chances of1310 DISINTEGRATION
their revival were dealt a severe blow by the passage of the
Johnson Act which provided that no private or public securi-
ties could be issued in the United States by any country
wholly or in part in default on the war debts due America.
During and '933 the basic pull was offset by an out-
ward flow of short term capital of $409 and million, leav-
ing on balance a moderate net adjustment to be made in gold
and currency. All that was needed therefore to convert the
United States into a magnet for the world's gold was a reversal
of the movement of short term capital. As shown in Table
37, this took place in 1934. The United States occupied the
extraordinary position of having an export surplus in its cur-
rent operations in goods and services and in its interest and
dividend account, and at the same time being an importer of
both long and short term capital. The dollar was conse-
quently strong in the world's exchanges and gold and cur-
rency imports jumped from $83 million in 1933 to $1,329
million in 1934. In 1935 the inward movement of long and
short term capital reached the extraordinary proportions of
over a billion and a half dollars and the gold import was over
$2 billion.
The increase in the price of gold in the United States called
forth new production in all gold mining areas, but after an
initial stimulus, the response of South African output to the
new conditions encountered a technical obstacle. The higher
price of gold made the exploitation of low grade ores profit-
able but new plants had first to be provided. Consequently
production increases on a large scale were delayed several
years, production even falling somewhat, though much
greater output was only a matter of time. Russian output was
also greatly stimulated, and Russia came, rather unexpectedly,
into the arena as a gold exporter capable of challenging the
supremacy even of South Africa. But this also was a gradual,
though an inevitable, evolution. Finally, ,the inducements to
gold export from the East continued great, and prospectingWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1311
was stimulated all over the world.3' At the same time fewer
ounces of gold were needed to fill the gap in the American
balance of payments than would have been the case at the
old price. Nevertheless, the powers of the United States to
attract gold added to the deflationary pressure on the rest of
the gold standard world. The central foreign exchange tri-
angle was fundamentally unbalanced at the moment of the
devaluation of the dollar. It was not free to adjust itself as
long as the dollar-franc parity was maintained, and it could
not cease to be a source of persistent economic strain the
world over until a new economic balance was worked out
through price and trade adjustments. Price adjustments in
this connection meant continued deflation in the gold stand-
ard countries and inflation in the United States. There were,
however, many obstacles to a solution along these lines, and
there could be no assurance that the central foreign exchange
triangle could be held in the pattern existing in February
1934untilthese great economic adjustments had been worked
out.
Cf. J. M. Keynes, Supp'y of Gold,' Economic Journal, Sept. 1936, pp.
413—8.CHAPTER 34
The Concept of Parity with Gold and the
Problem of Reconstruction
With the devaluation of the American dollar early in 1934
ourdetailed historical analysis of the international gold
standard ends. Changes in its form were beginning to be
made that were in harmony with the changes we have traced
in the substance of the institution and in the environment in
which it had to function. New techniques had been invented
and placed in partial operation. There was, however, no as-
surance that these alterations had finally ended the Disin-
tegration of the old structure. The process of rebuilding was
not very far advanced. The foundations were still weak, the
superstructure was only partly erected, and the purposes for
which the building was to be used were still in doubt. The
chief architects were not even in agreement as to whether
they were engaged on a second Restoration or on a work of
Reconstruction. But they had by no means abandoned the
project. Ever since September 1931 the world had been
proceeding upon the assumption of an ultimate return to
some permanent form of international gold standard.
In its fourth Annual Report of May 1934theBank for In-
ternational Settlements marshaled an impressive array of evi-
dence to show that this had always been the objective of the
three great groups of powers into which the gold standard sys-
tem had split in 1933.Theformation of the gold bloc itself
and the declaration of the central banks of France, the Nether-
lands, Italy, Poland, and Switzerland of July 3, 1933,con-
firming "their intention to maintain the free functioning of
the gold standard in their respective countries at the exist-
ing gold parities and within the framework of existing mone-
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tarylaws"; the British Empire declaration of July 27, 11933,
with its statement that "the ultimate aim of monetary policy
should be the restoration of a satisfactory international god
standard"; the adoption of an administrative international
gold bullion standard by the United States in February 11934,
accompanied by the general pronouncements of Presideit
Roosevelt concerning the desirability of a 'bullion base' for
the currency and the use of gold in the settlement of initeT-
nationalbalances 1—all combined to range the Western
Powers in accord on the question of a return to gold. The
titude of central banks with respect to the preservation an.d
increase of their gold reserves, public confidence in gold as a
medium of hoarding, the establishment of new central banks
as the agents for the administration of the gold standard
when once reestablished, and a gradual bringing under con-
trol of the problem of unfaithful money were also cited in
theBank's report as evidence both of intent to return to the
gold standard and of practical progress in the solution
some of the technical difficulties connected with such a re-
turn.
Running through these various declarations of policy and
implicit in the governmental and central banking attitudes
was the common view that gold was the only generally
ceptable international standard, and that the restoration
an international monetary system meant some form of
zation of national currencies in terms of gold; that is, the
establishment in each country of a parity between its own
currency and gold. At the conclusion of our studies, therefore,
we return once more to an examination of the concept
parity with gold.
Gold Wears a Coat of Many Colors
The most striking feature of the history of gold as an
i914to1934wasthat
1PresidentRoosevelt's Message to Congress, Jan. 15, 1933(FederalReserve
Bulletin, Feb. 1934,p.62).1314 DISINTEGRATION
economic significance as a criterion of the appreciation or
depreciation of non-gold currencies underwent a series of
remarkable changes. We have at various points stressed the
fact that before the war the abandonment of the gold stand-
ard meant the breaking off of one country from a system to
which most of the important commercial countries still ad-
hered. Since that system gave the world a fair degree of sta-
bility, the fluctuations in the exchange rates and prices of the
country abandoning the gold standard could be clearly meas-
ured in their relation to those of a very large group of other
nations bound together through gold. Abandonment of the
gold standard was usually forced by budget disequilibrium
and the need of governments to raise revenue by the most
effective of all taxes—monetary inflation. This strengthened
the popular conviction that stability in economic matters was
assured by the use of gold as a standard, and that gold and
'sound money' were one and the same thing.
Between 1914and1935,however,the boundaries of the
world of gold were subject to great changes. The significance
of the terms 'appreciation' and 'depreciation in gold' was,
as an inevitable corollary, subject to great changes also. Since
during this period the forms of the gold standard were always
maintained by at least one country of commercial importance,
it was, indeed, always possible to find a measure of the ap-
preciation or depreciation of other currencies in gold. The
currencies of the world were at all times either rising or fall-
ing relative to, or were at par with, gold, but gold itself wore
a coat of many colors. From 1919to1924 it was identified
with the American dollar. From 1925 to 1931itwas restored
to its pre-war significance as a general international standard.
From September 1931 to March 1933itwas the symbol of a
currency system whose two pillars were the dollar and the
franc. From March 1933 to February 1934itwas the symbol
of the small group of countries composing the gold bloc built
up around the franc. After February 1934was once more
restored in outward form to the position it held from Sep—WHO IS SOVEREIGN?
tember1931toMarch 1933,butin outward form only, for
the world of gold of February 2, 1934didnot have the same
economic significance as the world of gold of September 22,
1931. Nevertheless,throughout all these changes, the
connotations of gold as a universal standard continued
dominate feeling, thought, and action.
The Price of Gold
During the whole period from 1914to1934 the movement of
gold in international trade was basically determined by the
survival at all times of parts of the pre-war gold standard
machinery. Whenever an organized market for the sale of
gold is in operation and in any given country some institution
stands ready to take all gold offered to it at a fixed price, there
will be a bid in the market that is a function of that fixed
buying price and the rate of exchange between the country
offering it and the country in which the market is located. If,
in any given country some institution stands ready to
gold in unlimited amounts at a fixed price, there will be an
offer in the market that is a function of that fixed selling
price and the rate of exchange between the country offering
it and the country in which the market is located. If no suth
standing offers are in the market, and one such standing bid
is very much higher than the others, then the market price
will be determined by that bid, and newly produced gold
will go to the country that makes it. If the standing bids and
offers are close together the market price will be determined
by competition. Because the rate of exchange upon which
every such bid or offer is partly based is never an isolated
phenomenon but is always part of a world system of exchange
rates, the market price then reflects the meeting of world-
wide forces of supply and demand. When there is no organ-
ized market for the sale of gold, no world price can be
recorded in terms of a single currency. It can only be
pressed momentarily in terms of the currency of that country
whose standing bid offers at any given moment the highest1316 DISINTEGRATION
return at the existing exchange rates to the sellers of gold.
This was the situation during the war when the London
bullion market suspended its functions. But after the war the
traditional mechanism of the market with very minor inter-
ruptions was in full operation. Many gold transactions did
not pass through it, but few were not influenced by or re-
flected in the London price. Fluctuations in a true world
price for gold were regularly recorded in shillings and pence.
For this reason the interpretation of fluctuations in the Lon-
don price of gold has played an important part in these
studies. For this reason also a further consideration of the
bids for gold coming to the London market during the period
immediately preceding the devaluation of the dollar can
clarify., in important respects, the terms of the problem of
Reconstruction.
The Bids in the London Market
It was a general characteristic of the post-war period that,
with only a few exceptions,2 countries that went off the gold
standard by placing embargoes on the export of gold and
ceasing to convert their currencies into gold, did not alter
the legal obligation of their central banks and treasuries to
buy gold at fixed prices. The central banks of all such coun-
tries remained potential buyers of gold in the London market
and from one another. There was in the London market a
series of potential bids of the same character as those which
distributed gold throughout the world on an arbitrage basis
under the pre-war gold standard. The fluctuations in the
exchanges permitted by the suspension of the obligation of
many central banks to sell gold at fixed prices simply drew
these bids apart. None was in effective competition with the
bid based upon the dollar exchange rate from 1919 to 1924.
After 1925 a gradually increasing number, including the bid
of the Bank of England, came again into competition with the
2Swedenwas the only notable exception though, as shown elsewhere, other
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American bid. After September the Bank of England
bid, and after April the American bid, ceased to be com-
petitive. At no time did the bids, which had ceased to be com-
petitive with the highest bids in the market, cease to exist.
They no longer influenced the distribution of gold simply be-
cause gold sellers continued uniformly to sell their gold to the
highest bidder.
This fact, though obvious,issufficiently important to
justify some further illustration. The drawing apart of the
American and French bids for gold after April 1933 when the
dollar began to depreciate in Paris is shown by the accom-
panying table. The French parity bids differ slightly from
American and French Gold Bids in London,
MARCH 7APRIL 25JUNE 6JULY i8
Pound-dollar rate 3.431 3.85k 4.02 4.831
Dollar-parity bid for gold 120.20 107.20 102.34 85.46
Pound-franc rate 871
Franc-parity price for gold 120.24 119.20 121.68 123.24
London market price for gold 120.3 119.0 122.6 124.55
the market price partly because they are calculated roughly
from published exchange rates which may not have prevailed
throughout the day, and without allowance for the costs in-
volved which are separately determined for each transaction,
and partly because of the possible presence of other bids in
the market, either from other gold standard countries or
from purchasers willing to pay a 'premium' over the basic
price.
On the basis of the exchange rates on London prevailing
on any particular day for several currencies, a cross section
view of the bids in the market, excluding the bids of buyers
willing to pay a 'premium,' may be obtained. Such a cross
section view would include the official English bid, for the
Bank of England continued to maintain its standing offer
of 84.82 shillings per fine ounce. On September 28,
such a cross section view would have included the following1318 DISINTEGRATION
bids(shillings per fine ounce):Danish, 68.70; Swedish,
.79.32; English, 84.82; American, 87.84; French, 131.45; Ital-
ian, 131.74;Dutch,132.20;German,132.87. The actual gold
price on that day was 132 S. 4 d., indicating that the rough-
ness of our calculation does not involve serious error.
A Hypothetical Question
As suggested in the Introduction, the periods that throw
most light on the essential character of the international gold
standard system are those in which it is least effective. At such
times the contributions of various important mechanisms to
the working of the system, which are ordinarily not closely
examined but rather taken for granted, can best be assessed.
Similar considerations justify a serious attempt to answer the
hypothetical question: What would have been the basis of
the London price of gold if France had abandoned the gold
standard in the autumn of 1933?Additionaljustification for
asking this question lies in the undoubted fact that between
the time the United States left the gold standard and the
inauguration of its new gold policy, culminating in the Gold
Reserve Act ofi therewere periods of such financial
difficulty in France as to raise genuine doubts concerning her
ability to stay on the gold standard. In attempting an answer,
the observations just taken of the distribution of bids, actual
and potential, in the London market are of considerable as-
sistance.
If France had left the gold standard, the other gold-bloc
countries would either have remained on it or have aban-
doned it. If they had remained on it, the situation would have
been as follows: the franc-parity bid for gold in London
having become ineffective in the market, as the dollar-parity
bid had become ineffective before it, the remaining gold-
arbitrage bids would have been those of the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Switzerland as genuine gold standard countries,
and those of Germany, Poland, Italy, and other countries
still 'pegged to gold.'WHO IS SOVEREIGN? 13's
Allthe sterling countries, France, and the United States,
as well as Japan and other countries not falling definitely
within the gold or sterling groups, would then have been
obliged to consider themselves as depreciated in terms
gold. Germany, Poland, Italy, and other countries maintain-
ing parity with gold by means of exchange restrictions would
have been left, presumably, so to regulate their foreign ex-
change policy as to avoid depreciation in terms of the Swiss
franc, the belga, and the guilder. The Netherlands, Belgium,
and Switzerland would alone have remained undepreciated.
They would have stood at the apex of the world's currency
system, and would have surveyed the spectacle of all the great
commercial currencies of the former gold standard world
either depreciated in terms of their own currencies or pegged
to them.
The habit of thinking and acting with respect to gold upon
the principle that parity with gold is the only true indication
of a safe and stable currency came perilously near to leading
the world to the extraordinary conclusion that all the major
currencies of the world might become depreciated while only
the currencies of a few small countries of Europe remained
'sound.'
This conclusion was implicit in the continued use, under
radically altered conditions, of a method of reasoning appro-
priate under a widespread international gold standard. When
faced with the hard facts of the case, no reasonable person
would assume that the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzer-
land would have been able to suffer the consequences of a
depreciation of the franc, the dollar, and the pound in terms
of their currencies. French departure from the gold standard
in 1933wouldundoubtedly have broken up the gold bloc.
Persons of long experience in the gold market felt that such
an event would probably have produced, temporarily at least,
chaos in that market, because it would have produced chaos
in the foreign exchange markets of which the gold market is
a reflection. The foreign exchanges would, indeed, have fluc-1320 DISINTEGRATION
tuated for a time as violently as they did after the war, but
it would have been to the interest of countries formerly
associated in the gold bloc, especially the smaller countries,
to attach themselves to the sterling group or to the dollar, or
to maintain some cohesion among themselves. Some sort of
rough approximation between the exchange rates and the
purchasing powers of the various, currencies, such as that
which persisted from '919 to 1925 between the dollar and the
pound, may be assumed, provided the confusion of the situa-
tion had not given rise to uncontrollable panic within coun-
tries previously in the gold bloc. Their problem would not
have been very different from that faced Germany in
1924 in choosing between dollar and sterling stabilization.
In fact, it would have been the same, except that the dollar
would no longer have enjoyed the psychological attraction
of being a gold currency.
As the foreign exchange rates fluctuated, the sellers of gold
would still have sought to dispose of their gold to the highest
bidder. If, under these circumstances, the war and post-war
precedents of maintaining unchanged the legal obligations
of the various central banks and treasuries to buy gold at the
old prices had been observed, then the highest bid in the
London market would still have been determined as it was
before. It would still have been based upon the telegraphic
transfer parity rate between England and that country whose
legal buying price for gold, converted at the current rate of
exchange, would produce the highest offer in shillings for
gold in the London market. This might still have been the
French parity rate. It might have been the dollar-parity rate
if, for example, inflation in France or a flight of capital from
France had brought the dollar to a point where it was ap-
preciated in terms of sterling, as compared with the mint
parity of 4.8665, more than the franc was appreciated in
terms of sterling as compared with the mint parity of 124.2 1
francsto the pound.8 If in the course of the fluctuations of the
8Thesemint parities are not used here because they would have been ofWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1321
exchange rates there had been a sufficient movement of capi-
tal or sufficiently fundamental changes in the balance of
payments due to inflation in former gold countries, the ex-
changes of those countries might have, and indeed probably
would have, fallen in terms of sterling. That would have
meant a fall in the price of gold in London, and it is con-
ceivable that all exchanges, including the dollar, might have
depreciated in terms of sterling to the point where the bffd
of the Bank of England of 84 S. 9.81 d. per fine ounce woud
have become once more an effective bid for gold. Under
such circumstances gold would once more have become
ling and sterling gold. This result, it must be noted, might
have taken place not through the process of Great Britain
returning to the gold standard, but as the result of all other
countries leaving it. It is, of course, possible to make an-
other assumption with respect to the behavior of the ex-
changes; namely, that, as a result of the breakup of the gold
bloc, exchanges of other countries, including sterling, might
depreciate in terms of the dollar to such a point that the
American bid for gold, based upon the United States
ury's buying price of $20.67 per ounce, was the highest bid.
Then the dollar would again have become gold, and gold
the dollar, as it was from 1919to1925.
Undersuch a condition of confusion or chaos, if it may be
so described, in the foreign exchange markets, all
banks and treasuries, whose bids for gold based upon legally
fixed buying prices and fluctuating foreign exchange rates
were lower than the highest bid in the market, would have
been in the following position, already experienced in fact
by many of them:
1)Theywould have been accumulating a hidden profit in their
balance sheets as long as they continued to carry gold held by
them at the same figure in terms of the national currency as
any special economic significance, but because they indicate rates of exchange
at which the French and American bids for gold in London would be
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fore its depreciation in terms of the currency of that country
whose central bank was, for the moment, the highest bidder for
gold.
2) The ratios in which the standard coins of their countries stood
to one another according to the legal definition of their gold
contents would have been different from the ratios in which these
currencies actually stood to one another in the foreign exchange
markets.
These two things are not quite the same, for the first would
have been the result of a change in the relationship between
the given currency and that single currency which at the
moment happened to represent the best market for gold;
whereas the second would have been a reflection of a change
in the relationships between the given currency and all other
currencies that were previously gold standard currencies.
It is practically certain, however, that if the gold bloc had
disintegrated before the United States again became an effec-
tive bidder for gold, the London price of gold would not have
been allowed to become the football of the foreign exchanges
and of an obsolete set of central bank buying prices for gold
to the extent assumed above. The British Exchange Equali-
zation Account would probably have bought gold at or above
120 shillings per ounce. It would not have submitted to the
heavy losses on its gold that would have resulted from a lower
price. Had it done this it would, however, have been acting
upon the assumption of a subsequent return to the gold stand-
ard forced upon the world as a result of intolerable confusion
in the foreign exchange markets. To escape from the incon-
veniences of fluctuating exchanges and incidentally to reap
the profits hidden in the balance sheets of most central banks,
there would have been sooner or later a general 'return to
gold.' This would have had to take the form of a series of
decisions by central banks to pay enough more for gold to
make them again competitors in the market for gold; that is,
there would have been a series of decisions in various coun-
tries to change the legally defined gold content of their stand-WHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1323
ard coins in order to bring them into conformity with the
relationships existing fundamentally between the values of
their respective currencies and already roughly approximated
by the exchange rates. In such a general return to gold the
absolute quantities of gold to be contained in the various new
currency units could have been determined by the system of
exchange rates established by a series of stabilization opera-
tions, provided the legal definition of one important currency
unit as a certain weight of gold was taken as fixed. This cur-
rency would probably, though not necessarily, have been the
currency that for the moment was the basis for the highest
bid for gold in the world's market. Such a choice would have
maximized the profits that would have been realized by
central banks as an incidental consequence of returning to
gold, and would have minimized the losses of all who had
bought gold for hoarding purposes or as a hedge against
losses in exchange. If every country, however, felt free to
change the definition of its currency unit by unilateral action,
and were prepared to do so to force a solution of the problem
of exchange rates favorable to itself, the problem of return-
ing to gold would either have become insoluble or have been
postponed until an answer had been obtained through de-
structive international economic warfare, of the question,
Who is Sovereign over the Foreign Exchanges?
Who is
The discussion of the hypothetical question of the probable
effects of the abandonment of the gold standard by France
at a time when both the United States and Great Britain
were off the gold standard has served to emphasize that in
the reconstruction of a gold standard system that has once
broken down the question of exchange rates is primary, and
the question of the absolute quantities of gold in standard
coins is secondary. Over the first no country is sovereign;
therefore no country is sovereign over the second unless the
standard coin is completely divested of all international sig..1324 DISINTEGRATION
nificance. A powerful country in a gold standard system may
act entirely independently in defining its currency unit, and
for a time force the exchange rates to move as it wishes, but
the equal independence of other countries leaves it in their
power to nullify this action by a redefinition of their own
currency units. In the end, it is a condition of a general return
to gold either that the gold content of the monetary units of
powerful countries be simultaneously defined by interna-
tional agreement or that the gold content of the unit of some
one country be taken as a point of reference for unopposed
sovereign acts of revaluation by other countries.
In 1933anattempt was made at the World Economic Con-
ference to decide upon a system of exchange rates by inter-
national negotiation that would best promote general eco-
nomic recovery and give promise of stability in the future.
Had this attempt been successful a general return to gold
making this new system of rates permanent would have been
possible by a simple redefinition of the gold content of the
sovereign and the dollar. For in 1933Francedid not leave the
gold standard, the gold bloc did not break up, and the price
of gold in London continued to reflect the relation between
the pound and a substantial group of countries that had no
intention of changing the legal definition of their monetary
units. Therefore all that was necessary was to establish new
dollar and sterling parities with the franc such that the new
system of pars in the triangle would be in harmony with the
desired exchange rates. The four negatives of the Conference,
which had their basis in the conviction that sovereignty over
the exchanges was an attribute of national sovereignty de-
stroyed all hope of such action but left open the possibility
of sterling and dollar revaluations independently determined
upon and unopposed by France and the other gold bloc coun-
tries. When, however, the United States did redefine the gold
content of the dollar on January 31,1934, itredefined it on
such a basis that the new American bid for gold in the world
market would have been far higher than that based upon theWHO IS SOVEREIGN?
buyingprices of the gold bloc countries, unless the
cies of those countries appreciated in dollars very substan-
tially. Therefore the gold bloc countries were able to
competitive bidders for gold only by accepting a large part off
the burdens imposed by a depreciation of the dollar, and
shifting the remainder to sterling. The problem left by the
war of finding a proper set of exchange rates from whkh
proceed was still unsolved, for the choice of the rate off de-
valuationmade by the United States government was not
a recognition of a past change in the relation of the purthas..
ing power of the dollar to that of other currencies, but an
anticipation of changes that had not yet come into existence.
It constituted the fourth major problem of over- and uindc:•.
valuation of currencies in the post-war period. The new
dollar-franc parity could not provide the basis for a perma..
nent world-wide 'return to gold' unless American prices rose
relatively to prices in other countries. Italy's action in
creeing a general deflation in all Italian prices in April 1934
wasone answer to dollar devaluation, as Bruening's
tionary decrees of December 8, 1931 had been an answer to
the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain, The
reduction of the gold content of the Czechoslovak crown was
an answer off a different sort. Inflation within America was
the solution hoped for most generally, but this was by no
means certain to result in the adjustment actually required.
The fixed point of reference for a future sterling stabilization
in gold had now become an artificial relationship of uncertain
duration between the dollar and the franc.
The intention of the United States to maintain the defini-.
tion of the gold content of the dollar unchanged was expressly
left in doubt after the devaluation of 1934.Theability off
France to maintain the definition of the gold content off the
franc unchanged was also in doubt. The rate of exchange
between the United States and France, and between the
United States and all the 'gold bloc' countries, was not
stabilized in any enduring way. There was no definitive1326 DISINTEGRATION
stabilization of the most important foreign exchange rate in
the world—the dollar-sterling rate. The primary problem of
exchange rates being unsolved, the secondary problem of the
absolute content of the various gold standard units of the
future was unsolved too. The price of gold in London re-
flected the competitive bids of gold arbitrageurs, alternately
using the franc and the dollar-parity rate as the basis for their
bids. It represented, as it had before April 1933, the relation
of the pound to a group of gold currencies, including the
dollar and the franc, but this group was now much more
disunited and more subject to ultimate disruption.
The situation, as it stood immediately after the dollar de-
valuation but before the world-wide effects of that action
and of the economic policies prompted by it had had time
to work themselves out, may be described in terms of the
adjustments possible in the triangle as newly constituted.
When first established, the new parity between the franc and
the dollar of 6.65 cents per franc appreciably undervalued
the dollar in terms of the franc. At the same time, even in
the light of the increase in American prices since April 1933,
alarge section of British opinion regarded a sterling-dollar
rate of 4.50asthe maximum permissible. If, however, ster-
ling had fallen to 4.50, the franc would have had to rise to
67.7 francs to the pound, an appreciation of 45½ per cent
over sterling since September i931. Thus,as long as the gold
content of the dollar remained as defined by the Gold Reserve
Act of 1934andFrance did not revalue the franc, the estab-
lishment of a dollar-sterling rate satisfactory to Great Britain
would have shifted an intolerable burden to France and to the
gold countries. Their answer would surely have been devalua-
tion before 1936. If the French franc had fallen in London to
84 francs to the pound, about the rate at which it had been
temporarily stabilized during the World Economic Confer-
ence, while the dollar-franc rate remained at the new parity,
sterling would have had to rise to 5.57 in New York. A heavy
economic strain would have been shifted to the sterling groupWHO IS SOVEREIGN?
and a deflationary policy would have been imposed on Great
Britain. Neither a sterling-dollar rate satisfactory to Great
Britain nor a sterling-franc rate satisfactory to France was coirm•
patible with the dollar-franc rate satisfactory to the United
States. As long as the three rates remained approximate'y as
they were in February i theburdens of dollar
ation in francs were shared between the world of sterling and
the world of gold, but they were not shared equally. The
angle was unbalanced and not free to adjust itself and was
bound to break its bonds at the weakest point. The French
devaluation of 1936 proved that the United States was not
sovereign over the foreign exchanges.
Rationalizing the Behavior of Hoarders and Exchange
Stabilization Funds with respect to Gold
Our cross section view of the bids in the London bullion
market in 1933 excluded the bids of those willing to pay a
'premium' for gold. This term requires careful
for when used in connection with gold it may have any one
of three meanings:
i) The amount the holder of paper money must pay above
face value in order to purchase the same nominal amount of gold.
It is in this sense that the term has been traditionally used in
cussing 'depreciated paper money,' e.g., the American greenbacks.
2) The difference between the open market price of gold in
don and the statutory buying price of the Bank of England. Jit
was in this sense that the South African gold mining industry
habitually spoke of the premium on gold during the entire
1919—25.
3) The difference between the price of gold based upon the
telegraphic transfer rate between London and New York or Paris
or some other gold standard country and the actual market price
paid for gold in the London market. It is in this sense that the
London bullion market speaks of a premium on gold.
The premium, in the third sense, existing in London dur-
ing July, August, and September 1933 is shown on Chart1328 DISINTEGRATION
in which the franc parity price in London, based upon the
daily published quotations of the exchange rate between
London and Paris with a deduction to allow for the cost of
transporting gold between the two centers and the actual
market price of gold, are plotted. Although the franc parity
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rate(Table 86)is only an approximation because actual
quotations change during the day, and the actual cost of
shipment is continually changing, the general behavior of
the premium appears clearly in the chart.
The existence of this premium was a reflection of the
demand for gold of purchasers who were willing to pay more
than those who wished to buy gold as an arbitrage transaction.
In contrast to the situation from 1919to India was not
among them for reasons given in Chapter 23, but her place
was taken by buyers of gold as a hedge in foreign exchange
transactions, simple hoarders, and official control agencies.
For illustrative purposes two transactions showing the use
of gold as a hedge may be briefly described. If someone pos-
Cf. Ch. 10,NewYork as a Residual Buyer of Gold.TABLE 86
GoldPremium in London, July—September 21,1933, daily
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sessing sterling had a future payment to make in France and
wished to provide for it in advance, he could buy francs at
the existing rate of exchange or he could buy gold. If he
bought francs, and France did not go off the gold standard,
and the franc rose in terms of sterling from 8o to 70 francs
to the pound, his position would be protected, for he would
have his francs at the old rate. If he had bought gold at a
price based upon the then existing franc-sterling rate, or
even a little above it, he would still have been protected, Mr
the Bank of France would still have bought the gold from
him at its statutory price, and he would have, in effect,
obtained his francs at the old rate. If he had bought francs,
and then France had gone off the gold standard, and the
franc had depreciated in sterling he would have been pro-
tected against loss, but would not have derived any advantage
from the fall in francs. If, however, he had b.ought gold, and
France had gone off the gold standard, and the franc had
depreciated in gold as well as in sterling, then he could have
sold his gold in the Netherlands, or Switzerland, or in any
other gold standard country and bought francs with the
proceeds. This would have yielded him more francs and the
franc debt would have been paid more cheaply. This was the
reasoning of the market which did not take full account of
the changes that a French departure from the gold standard
would have brought about in the remaining gold bloc coun-
tries. Upon this reasoning persons having debts to pay in
France in the future could lose nothing by buying gold in-
stead of francs in any case, but if France went off the gold
standard before the debt was due they might have made a
profit. However faulty the logic, the conclusion had a strong
pragmatic sanction. A second transaction was of the following
type: speculators who thought that France might leave the
gold standard could sell francs short and buy gold in India
for future delivery in England. If France did go off the gold
standard, they could ship the gold to England, sell it there,
and purchase francs to cover. Such a position could be carriedWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1331
forwardfrom month to month, and was preferred by many
speculators to purchasing and earmarking gold in France,
because of fear that some such measures might be taken there
with respect to gold hoarding as were subsequently taken
in the United States. These examples are given because they
represent the transactions of experts in the foreign exchange
markets rather than those of the general public. They rested
upon the assumption that if France had gone off the gold
standard, there would still have been a high price for gold
in London.
Many purchases of gold by private individuals were not
based upon so refined a type of calculation, but upon an
irrational conviction that gold was the safest of all stores of
value. This was the same type of demand for gold that had
persisted throughout the post-war period as a natural con-
sequence of the loss of value of various types of paper money,
and was exemplified on a gigantic scale in the domestic drain
of gold in the United States prior to the breakdown of 1933.
Many hoarders were willing to pay a premium in London for
gold rather than take it from the Bank of France, thereby
incurring the justified displeasure of that institution. This
hoarding demand was primarily a reflection of the age-old
confidence in gold as something having 'intrinsic' value. It was
based upon the assumption that somewhere in the woridi
there would still remain a demand for gold at a high price,
whatever happened to particular currency units.
The statistical importance of such purchases is indicated
by a passage in the Fourth Annual Report of the Bank for
International Settlements (pp. 5—7):
"During themonths'period up to the end of March 1934the
net imports of gold to Great Britain were, according to Customs
statistics, equal to about 4,500millionSwiss francs, while the in-
crease in the holdings of the Bank of England was only about
1,750millionSwiss francs; the difference may to some minor ex-
tent represent an increase in the holdings of the Exchange Equal-
isation Account, but by far the larger portion appears to have1332 DISINTEGRATION
gone into private hoards. Indeed, out of 7,000 million Swiss
francs, at which the total amount of gold hoarded has been esti-
mated, it would appear that perhaps one third was held in Eng-
land by persons who, as a rule, were non-residents."
The difference between British gold exports and imports and
changes in the Bank of England reserve, brought out in this
passage, is shown graphically for 1933 in Chart 82.
Though in comparison with the amount of gold bought for
hoarding or as exchange hedges, the purchases of the British
CHART 82
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EqualizationAccount and of other similar funds were not
statistically impressive, they had a fundamental bearing upon
the hoarding demand. Purchases of gold by the Account
eliminated the exchange risk on its holdings of particular
foreign currencies. They were in fact, like the gold purchases
of private speculators, a foreign exchange hedge. The oppor-
tunity of hedging in this way was, of course, also open to the
newly formed American Stabilization Fund, and to any other
exchange stabilization funds that might be established by
other countries, and to central banks. It provided the basis
for a new general technique of exchange stabilization based
on gold.
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Purchasesof gold by the Account did not however elimi-
nate the general exchange risk involved in a fluctuating price
of gold,5 but created a strong interest on the part of the Treas-
ury in seeing to it that the price of gold in sterling should
not go below the average cost at which the gold in the Ac-
countwas bought. This consideration also was of general
application. The greatest holders of gold in the world were
central banks and treasuries. As such they had a strong vested
interest in preventing their gold holdings from falling un
valuein terms of their national currencies. To the extent that
they did prevent the price of gold from falling, the
dons of gold boarders and gold speculators would be justified.
If, indeed, the governments of the world decided to
don the whole idea of gold as standard, even in a juridical
sense, and all central banks consequently divested themselves
entirely of their gold assets, then gold, as a store of value,
might suffer the fate of silver in earlier years. Or if some
commercially important gold standard country, in order to
force an appreciation of its exchange with reference to other
gold currencies or for any other reason, should reduce its
buying price for gold, and the other gold standard countries
reduced their buying prices for gold in order to resist the
decline in their exchanges, then the expectations of gold
hoarders and gold speculators would be falsified. The price
of gold in all gold standard currencies would be less, and
provided this readjustment had not moved the sterling rate
on gold standard countries downward, the price of gold
would be less in sterling also. Against such developments the
self-interest of central banks and treasuries as large gold
holders was a guarantee, even if other considerations had not
made them extremely unlikely. In 1934exactlythe opposite
sequence of events took place. The United States raised the
price of gold in dollars, and in order to meet the situation.
created by this act, other central banks also were forced,
eventually, to pay more for gold. The calculations of the
Cf. Ch. 3t,TheEstablishment of the Exchange Equalization Account.1334 DISINTEGRATION
sophisticated speculator in the exchange market, the instinct
of the humble hoarder, and the policy of exchange stabiliza-
tion funds and central banks found a practical justification
in the fact that those who had power to reach final decisions
in these matters had the strongest motives for preventing a
decline in the price of gold.
Four Facets of the Problem of Reconstruction
The assurance given gold hoarders concerning the future of
gold as a store of value by the self-interest of central banks
and treasuries in maintaining the price of gold extended only
to a guarantee that they would not receive less than they had
paid in terms of national currencies for the gold they held.
It did not, of course, include any protection against a change
in the value of those currencies. In its concluding paragraphs
this study cannot enter into the vast subject of the forces
determining the value of gold, but it can point out that the
logical outcome of the forces determining the price of gold
after 1934 was to release the former gold bloc countries from
deflationary pressure and to make possible, upon a more
nearly world-wide scale, the development of the easy money
and price raising programs insisted upon in one form or
another by Great Britain and the United States.
The Question of Rates
This was accomplished in the course of two years because, in
the language of the gold market, the devaluation of the
American gold dollar forced the gold bloc countries to pay
more for gold. In the terms employed in our discussion of the
central foreign exchange triangle it was accomplished by an
adjustment of the less important leg of the triangle to the
more important legs. The triahgle was not adjusted by a
common movement of sterling in terms of francs and dollars,
but by a breakdown in the newly established dollar-franc
parity, and a common movement of francs in terms of dollars
and pounds. The development of the inflationary policies ofWHO IS SOVEREIGN?
the United States was sufficiently rapid to allow Great Britab
to accept, if not willingly, at least de facto, the general
of about 5 as a basis for something more than a momentary
stabilization of the pound in New York. At this rate it proved
possible for the easy money and credit expansion policy of
Great Britain to continue unchecked, and for the
of England's garden to be carried vigorously forward. The
dollar-sterling rate did in fact emerge once more as the trunf.
line of the world's exchanges and devaluations within
gold bloc constituted an adjustment of other exchange rates
to it. These devaluations made possible in France, and b
some degree in other countries, the adoption of
monetary policies along the general lines being pushed
ward elsewhere. In 1936 the groundwork was laid, as far as
exchange, rates were concerned, for basic solutions of the
problem of setting in motion some sort of stable internationa
currency system, though these solutions were not yet actually
worked out.
The Question of Environment
The obstacles to the successful functioning of any form of
fixed exchange rate system based on gold, moreover, were
still formidable. The rigidity of the internal economic struc-
ture of countries experimenting with a planned economy or
regulated trade meant that the so-called corrective influence
of gold movements upon the structure of prices could no
longer be relied on. This was not, however, a fatal obstacle
to the successful operation of a properly managed gold stand-
ard system. We have stressed the view that even under the
pre-war gold standard, the corrective influence of gold move-
ments on price levels was not as vital in forcing internationai
adjustments as has often been asserted. Price levels were
together more largely because they contained a common
element, namely, the prices of internationally traded-in com-
modities, than because they were corrected by contractions
and expansions in the credit base caused by gold movements.1336 DISINTEGRATION
Nevertheless, in further developing the techniques of the gold
standard the fact had to be faced that changes in the reserve
ratios of central banks would no longer be a very positive force
in controlling the relations of the economies of particular
countries with those of the mass of other countries. The quota
system of trade restrictions, and the frequent changes by legis-
lation and administrative action in effective tariff rates, was a
second well recognized obstacle. The instability of the new
protection was its chief menace to international trade, but
there was force in the reiterated contention of the gold bloc
countries that this instability was partly due to fluctuating ex-
changes. In part this obstacle could be overcome if once the
exchange rates were stabilized and the deadlock over 'the
question of precedence' broken, but an international gold
standard with fixed exchange rates could not hope to operate
successfully for many years unless some tariff system existed.
It could operate successfully under a high tariff system supple-
mented by bilateral trade agreements, but frequent changes
in tariff rates and the absence of any relatively fixed system of
trade relations were forces against which it could not perma-
nently contend. A third obstacle was 'unfaithful money,' and
the new mobility of private investment in internationally
traded in securities. In part this was a permanent problem
arising out of new habits of investment, new methods of fi-
nancing, and new distrust of money, which though lulled for
long periods could easily be aroused by untoward events, as
it could not have been before the war. In part it was an in-
heritance from the accumulated credit expansions of the post-
war era. It was, however, also to some extent a function of ex-
change instability, and therefore could be partly met by the
mere maintenance of stable exchange rates. In addition, 'the
great American gold magnet,' and the fact that the New York
market still retained great capacity to be an international
money market but had abandoned its attempt to play that
role on a large scale, added to the difficulties of operating a
gold standard system. Finally, an essential and profoundlyWHO IS SOVEREIGN? 1337
significantelement in the new environment was that a ceE-
tury of capital exports for the development of the world's re-
sources had ended. With it had ended also the marvellously
adaptable and flexible use of credit as a time-bridging device
to fill the gaps in the international balances of payments char-
acteristic of the pre-war international gold standard.
The Question of Techniques
These changes in the environment in which a reconstructed
gold standard had to operate required radical changes in the
techniques by which it was managed. The new techniques
were introduced for the most part by a series of changes in
detail of which our entire post-war analysis has been a record.
The most spectacular were the dropping of the gold circula-
tion; the decline in the importance of the discount market,
and the taking over of its functions by direct central banking
control over the volume of credit; the rise of exchange stabi-
lization funds to deal with the problem of unfaithful money
and capital flight and to provide a substitute for the balancing
functions of private short term movements of the exchange
and interest arbitrage type; the development of systems of ex-
change control; and the determination of foreign exchange
and central banking policies by governments. The chief in-
struments for the promotion of exchange stability under the
new order were already in existence in 1934.Atthe World
Economic Conference the generalization of the techniques
employed by the British Exchange Equalization Account was
suggested, and in the Tripartite Currency Agreements of
1936 and their extensions this proposal received practical ap-
plication, while the possibilities and limitations of exchange
control as an alternative system were being discovered by the
test of experience. No condensed summary of the new tech-
niques, however, can do justice to the new forms of manage-
ment which had replaced the pre-war type of banking control.
A full length portrait, such as has been painted in these pages,
alone can accomplish that task.1338 DISINTEGRATION
The Question of Objective
During the period of Disintegration fundamental questions
of ultimate objective in the organization of international cur-
rency relations were raised. Many students of the problem
held that, since the breakup of the integrated world credit sys-
tem was complete and irrevocable, national currencies should
not in future be bound together in a fixed system of exchange
rates. Others, making a virtue of necessity, saw in exchange
control the birth of a new and better system. The ultimate
goal as well as the time, place, and method of a return to gold
was called in question. These are very broad issues, involving
the whole question whether the advantages of nationalism
and national self-sufficiency outweigh the advantages of inter-
national division of labor, whether the advantages of an ap-
propriately managed gold standard system with fixed exchange
rates are greater than the advantages of alternative systems of
stabilized national economies with free exchange rates, or of
exchange control and authoritarian planning. Such questions
lie outside the scope of this book, but the conclusion may be
drawn from our historical analysis that, as far as currency
management is concerned, the issues are not as clear cut as
they sometimes appear to be.
The world does not escape from the strains of a decentral-
ized credit system in which center countries pursue contra-
dictory financial and economic policies and all countries as-
sert that they are sovereign over the exchanges merely by
casting its exchanges loose from their moorings or dividing its
currencies into fragments. There is no escape from the prob-
lem of finding some way, if not of coordinating, at least of ad-
justing the economic policies of the various countries short of
abandoning international trade. The history of post-war com-
mercial policy is a story of mutual adjustment by measures of
attack and defense. The unfortunate effects of unrestricted
tariff warfare were universally recognized as undesirable, and
therefore a solution of the problem of international trade ap-WHO IS SOVEREIGN?
propriateto a system of nationalistic economies and independ..
ent national currencies was brought forward. This was the
conclusion of a series of bilateral trade agreements. In
ing out these agreements, however, it was early found
sary either to provide for triangular trade, and to make some
headway against their restrictive effects by converting them
into regional agreements and including in them the most fa°.
vored nation clauses, or to divert the natural course of trade
into new channels by methods of coercion, discrimination,
and fractional depreciation. The logical conclusion of
first tendency is the restoration of a system of world-wide tirade
relations.The conditions most favorable to the establishmenc.
of such a world-wide system of general trade agreements are
those which are also prerequisites for a workable
tional gold standard system. The logical conclusion of the
second tendency is the antithesis of the first, namely, the
struction of world markets.
The intermediate program of establishing stable internal
conditions and allowing the exchanges to fluctuate does not
theoretically imply that any nation will force a certain ex-
change rate upon other nations. But because of the many short
term influences that act in the exchange markets, and because
it is relatively easy to move exchange rates under those cir-
cumstances, exchange rates often do not properly reflect the
underlying relationships of various currencies. Unless their
fluctuations are kept within relatively narrow bounds, they
will continually over- and under-correct changes in the cost
and price level relationships of various countries, and the
terpretation of such under- and over-corrections will give rise
to many points of international conflict. The inconvenience
of unrestricted fluctuations brought exchange control funds
into existence in order to carry out de facto pegging either by
agreement or by conflict. The advantage of such an arrange-
ment over the international gold standard with fixed exchange
rates consists chiefly in the impermanence of the rates chosen
for such de facto stabilization operations. Impermanence,1340 DISINTEGRATION
however, is a matter of degree. The advantages of temporary
pegging by exchange equalization funds would be slight in-
deed if it did not continue long enough to make possible the
conclusion and fulfilment of long term international con-
tracts, including contracts of loan. The advantages of a per-
manent system of exchange rates that cannot be altered with-
out grave psychological and political repercussions under
conditions in which international trade is obstructed, domes-
tic credit policies in the center countries diverse, capital move-
ments sudden, large, and unpredictable, and currencies nom-
inally standing at fixed gold parities broken up into many
special categories, are a]so doubtful. Under such conditions
occasional deviation from a system of fixed rates may be a
positive good.
The long run objectives of all three policies, internal mon-
etary management with fluctuating exchanges, the mainte-
nance of fixed rates by an international gold standard, and
exchange control are identical in one important respect. All
aim to achieve maximum stability externally and internally.
If all major economic powers follow a policy of internal price
stability, relatively stable exchange rates are both a conse-
quence of that policy and an aid in its execution. If all major
economic powers join in an international convention of any
sort permanently fixing the exchange rates between them,
relatively stable prices are both a consequence of that con-
vention and a requirement for its continued existence. This
requirement cannot be met in a free economy unless a basic
economic equilibrium can be established. Those who advo-
cate a system of exchange control as a positive good rather
than a necessary evil contend that it is a new monetary system
that avoids the Hobson's choice between unstable exchanges
and unstable internal prices. Under all these policies curren-
cies are managed. None can be passive and none can be suc-
cessful as an instrument for promoting human welfare unless
there is economic and political peace. The policies of free ex-
changes and of exchange control can more easily be con-